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Abstract
In this technical report we describe an approach for verifying
cryptographic protocol implementations written in C. We statically
prove the correctness of these implementations with the general pur-
pose verifier VeriFast. More concretely we prove: memory safety, the
absence of explicit and implicit information leaks, and functional
correctness which includes protocol integrity. Our invariant-based
approach requires an extension of the symbolic model of cryptog-
raphy in order to work for protocol implementations in C written
against an existing cryptographic API.
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In this technical report we describe an approach for verifying crypto-
graphic protocol implementations written in C. We statically prove the
correctness of these implementations with the general purpose verifier Veri-
Fast. More concretely we prove: memory safety, the absence of explicit and
implicit information leaks, and functional correctness which includes pro-
tocol integrity. Our invariant-based approach requires an extension of the
symbolic model of cryptography in order to work for protocol implemen-
tations in C written against an existing cryptographic API.
1. Introduction
We almost cannot imagine our everyday lives anymore without a connection
to the Internet. From managing your bank accounts to staying in touch
with your friends: we heavily rely on this massive piece of technology. In
order to provide a secure environment for these day-to-day activities, web
browsers and the web servers they communicate with use cryptography.
In this technical report, we describe an approach to proving the cor-
rectness of such cryptographic software written in the C programming lan-
guage. Our approach, depicted in Figure 1, allows to verify cryptographic
protocol implementations. Such an implementation is a software realization
of a particular communication pattern that establishes a certain security
goal (e.g. the authentication of a request) using cryptographic primitives
(e.g. key generation and encryption). Each protocol participant is assigned
a specific role and different roles are implemented separately as, for in-
stance, distinct C functions like the functions A and B from Figure 1.
Together, these roles make up a protocol implementation. Assuming the
cryptographic primitives are perfect, we prove that the implementation of
such a protocol is memory safe, does not leak secrets and indeed achieves
its security goals.
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void enc(...)
//@ PRE
//@ POST
{
...
}
...
void dec(...)
//@ PRE
//@ POST
{
...
}
...
void A(...)
//@ PRE
//@ POST
{
...
}
void B(...)
//@ PRE
//@ POST
{
...
}
M1
M2
Mn
. . .
Target Target
Assumed correct Assumed correct
Figure 1: Overview of our approach for verifying cryptographic protocols
The approach we developed builds on top of the work from [5], and is
similar to the approaches proposed in [1] and [3]: use a general purpose
program verifier to verify protocol implementations that are written against
a trusted API containing the cryptographic primitives. First, the semantics
of the functions in this API are specified through contracts (i.e. the pre-
and postconditions in Figure 1) which are assumed correct. Then, the
corresponding verification methodology can use these contracts to reason
about the protocol implementations (refinement type checking in [1] and
symbolic execution in [3]).
The cryptographic API in both [1] and [3] is designed in such a way
that verification of the protocols within the symbolic model of cryptogra-
phy is directly possible. In the symbolic model all messages are terms of
a cryptographic algebra. The cryptographic primitives construct messages
in this algebra and pairing/unpairing operators allow to compose/decom-
pose messages. For this reason the cryptographic API in both [1] and [3]
contains, besides the cryptographic primitives, functions to compose and
decompose messages, and the network API accepts and returns these mes-
sages. The contracts of all the functions in the resulting API then allow to
track the symbolic message content of memory regions during verification.
More importantly however, the contracts of the network API enable the
enforcement of a network invariant for messages allowed on the network.
This network invariant is key to proving functional correctness and security
of protocol implementations.
A crucial difference with our approach is that we target protocol im-
plementations that employ preexisting cryptographic libraries. PolarSSL
and the more widely known OpenSSL are two examples of such preex-
isting libraries that provide the required cryptographic functionality for
writing protocol implementations. Since we target protocols that use such
libraries we do not have the liberty to design the trusted API as we see
fit. We are stuck with their accompanying APIs and most cryptographic
libraries do not have a structured message concept such as is necessary for
the approaches described in [1] and [3]. Instead, they leave it up to the
protocol implementation to compose and parse messages using C buffers
and C functions like memcpy and memcmp.
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Our primary goal was to devise a technique that enabled us to verify
protocol implementations that are written against a preexisting crypto-
graphic API. Although in such a setting the symbolic model could not
be directly applied as in [1] or [3], we aspired to use a similar symbolic
reasoning. Therefore we introduced an extension of the symbolic model
of cryptography. This extended model enables the verification of protocol
code that itself implements the composing and parsing of messages. It
allows to associate symbolic cryptographic values with bit strings present
in memory, and to keep track of these values while composing and parsing
messages. In turn, the contracts of the functions in a cryptographic API
can express associations between input and output buffers to functions on
the one hand, and the symbolic result of cryptographic primitives on the
other hand.
The rest of this report starts with an introduction of our extended sym-
bolic model in Section 2. Then, in Section 3, we show how to apply the
model with a complete example. Next, we give our results in Section 4 and
finally we conclude this report in Section 5.
2. Extended Symbolic Model in VeriFast
In this section we discuss our extended symbolic model of cryptography.
Since we encoded this model directly in VeriFast1 (a more fundamental
specification in the Coq proof assistant2 is under development), it is in-
structive to familiarize yourself with general verification in VeriFast before
you continue reading [4, 6]. The encoding of our extended symbolic model
depends on different concepts from this general purpose verifier for C pro-
grams. So in the remainder of this text, basic knowledge about verification
with VeriFast is assumed.
In the outline of our approach here we focus on the generation of random
values (i.e. symmetric keys and nonces), hashing and symmetric authen-
ticated encryption. Since the semantics of regular symmetric encryption
are inherently more complex, we postpone its discussion to Appendix A.
Our approach deals with asymmetric encryption and signatures in a very
similar way as regular symmetric encryption and they are not discussed in
this text. The full encoding of our extended symbolic model in VeriFast
is available in the examples/crypto with flow directory of the latest
VeriFast release. This encoding also deals with keyed hashes, asymmetric
encryption and signatures.
The following subsections will introduce our extended symbolic model of
cryptography step-by-step. We start by showing a template for a verified
protocol in Subsection 2.1. While this template does not yet introduce any
concepts or definitions from our extended symbolic model, it will be useful
1VeriFast: http://distrinet.cs.kuleuven.be/software/verifast
2The Coq proof assistant: https://coq.inria.fr/
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while explaining later definitions. Then, in Subsection 2.2, we give the
definitions to track principal identities during symbolic execution. Each
function implementing (part of) a protocol role will need such an identity
as a permission to invoke specific other functions from the cryptographic
API (e.g. the network functions). When a protocol participant misbehaves,
this permission is revoked in order to enforce the security guarantees of our
model. Next we show how verified protocol code can actually send bytes
on the network in Subsection 2.3. For this we chose the fairly standard
(i.e. comparable to the sys/socket.h header from POSIX) network API
of PolarSSL3 and augmented it with VeriFast contracts to specify its se-
mantics. While any other network API for C could be used provided it
is augmented with analogous contracts, we chose that of PolarSSL since
we also chose the cryptographic primitive implementations of PolarSSL in
Subsection 2.4. In that subsection we discuss all the definitions required to
give meaningful contracts to cryptographic primitive implementations and
we end the subsection by showing contracts of the relevant PolarSSL prim-
itives. The rationale for choosing PolarSSL here is that it is a lightweight,
and thus relatively simple cryptographic library as it targets the embedded
market. Again a different cryptographic API for C could be used instead,
as long as the contracts are analogous to the ones shown in Subsection 2.4.
It’s also discussed there that we call the symbolic representation of the
result of a cryptographic primitive, a cryptogram. That result could be
a secret (e.g. a generated session key) and the caller of a cryptographic
primitive does not automatically have the permission to read from the cor-
responding memory region. This prevents secret information from leaking
into regular program variables or into the program’s control flow. How
to prove that such a memory region does not contain any secrets in order
to get read permissions to it, is explained in Subsection 2.5. We use an
invariant-based approach for these proofs, very similar to [1] and [3]. The
main difference is that we enforce this invariant on readable memory re-
gions, instead of on messages on the network. These invariants are also
the key mechanism to prove security properties of protocol implementa-
tions. Our attacker model then, is defined in Subsection 2.6 and finally, we
conclude this section in Subsection 2.7 with a discussion of an induction
principle for cryptograms which facilitates the verification of protocol code.
2.1. Verified protocol template
A template for a two-party protocol is shown in Listing 1. This template
does not yet introduce any concepts or definitions from our extended sym-
bolic model itself and it is completely understandable with the explanations
from the VeriFast Tutorial [4]. It will however, be very helpful in explaining
all the definitions that follow. The subsequent subsections will gradually
3PolarSSL (recently rebranded to mbed TLS): https://tls.mbed.org/
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explain how to fill in this template to end up with a verified protocol.
The two roles from the protocol template from Listing 1 are implemented
as indefinitely repeated distinct threads of the same application on the same
host. However, after having verified a filled in template within our extended
symbolic model, the two roles can be distributed over different hosts with-
out violating the properties proven during verification and they will be
secure under our attacker model and multiple concurrent runs. To fill in
this template, the code that implements the different protocol roles should
be placed in the two functions role1 and role2. If this code requires
access to some specific resources, the argument lists of role1 and role2
and also their contracts have to be updated accordingly. The updated
contracts of both these functions should not only give the implementing
code the necessary permissions, it should also encode the security proper-
ties of the protocol at hand. How to encode these properties is gradually
explained throughout the subsequent subsections.
Before we continue the discussion of the template from Listing 1, it is
instructive to look at a small example of a partially filled in template. List-
ing 2 shows such an example where role1 requires an argument arg and
the permission perm. The example illustrates that for each role the bod-
ies of the predicate instances pthread run pre and pthread run post
should be updated to reflect the chosen argument list and contract for the
corresponding C function. Also the call to function role1 in role1 t has
to be adjusted accordingly. The predicate instances pthread run pre
and pthread run post and the function role1 t are defined here be-
cause of the way that VeriFast deals with threading and are not further
discussed (see [4] for more details).
After launching the attacker thread, the main function from the tem-
plate in Listing 1 invokes both protocol roles as different threads inside an
infinite loop. The loop does not wait for these threads to join in order to
allow multiple concurrent executions of the protocol and it uses two leak
statements to cleanup the symbolic heap. Finally, the last step in filling
out this template is to set up the right context (which will be protocol-
dependent) in the loop of the main function before launching the different
threads. After all these steps (not necessarily in discussed order), and after
having verified the filled in template, the result is a verified cryptographic
protocol implementation.
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void role1()
//@ requires true;
//@ ensures true;
{ /* ... */ }
/*@
predicate_family_instance pthread_run_pre(role1_t)
(void *data, any info) = info == none;
predicate_family_instance pthread_run_post(role1_t)
(void *data, any info) = info == none;
@*/
void *role1_t(void* data) //@ : pthread_run_joinable
//@ requires pthread_run_pre(role1_t)(data, ?x);
//@ ensures pthread_run_post(role1_t)(data, x) &*& result == 0;
{
//@ open pthread_run_pre(role1_t)(data, _);
role1();
//@ close pthread_run_post(role1_t)(data, _);
return 0;
}
void role2()
//@ requires true;
//@ ensures true;
{ /* ... */ }
/*@
predicate_family_instance pthread_run_pre(role2_t)
(void *data, any info) = info == none;
predicate_family_instance pthread_run_post(role2_t)
(void *data, any info) = info == none;
@*/
void *role2_t(void* data) //@ : pthread_run_joinable
//@ requires pthread_run_pre(role2_t)(data, ?x);
//@ ensures pthread_run_post(role2_t)(data, x) &*& result == 0;
{
//@ open pthread_run_pre(role2_t)(data, _);
role2();
//@ close pthread_run_post(role2_t)(data, _);
return 0;
}
int main(void)
//@ requires true;
//@ ensures true;
{
// ... create a thread that executes the attacker implementation
while (true)
//@ invariant true;
{
pthread_t t1, t2;
//@ close pthread_run_pre(role1_t)(NULL, none);
//@ close pthread_run_pre(role2_t)(NULL, none);
pthread_create(&t1, NULL, &role1_t, NULL);
pthread_create(&t2, NULL, &role2_t, NULL);
//@ leak pthread_thread(_, role1_t, NULL, none);
//@ leak pthread_thread(_, role2_t, NULL, none);
}
}
Listing 1: A template for a verified two-party protocol
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//@ predicate perm() = true /* &*& ... */;
struct args{ int arg; };
void role1(int arg)
//@ requires perm();
//@ ensures perm();
{ /* ... */ }
/*@
predicate_family_instance pthread_run_pre(role1_t)
(void *args, any info) =
args_arg(args, ?val) &*& info == some(val) &*& perm();
predicate_family_instance pthread_run_post(role1_t)
(void *args, any info) =
args_arg(args, ?val) &*& info == some(val) &*& perm();
@*/
void *role1_t(void* data) //@ : pthread_run_joinable
//@ requires pthread_run_pre(role1_t)(data, ?x);
//@ ensures pthread_run_post(role1_t)(data, x) &*& result == 0;
{
//@ open pthread_run_pre(role1_t)(data, _);
role1(((struct args*) data)->arg);
//@ close pthread_run_post(role1_t)(data, _);
return 0;
}
Listing 2: Example of a filled in template for one protocol role
2.2. Tracking identities of principals
As part of our model, each function that implements a protocol role will
need an identity to invoke specific functions from the trusted cryptographic
API. This identity is not only a permission to use the network API (see
Subsection 2.3), to generate random keys (see Subsection 2.4) or to per-
form unauthenticated decryption (see Appendix A), it also allows us to
link generated keys to the identity of the creator. During the verification
of, according to our model, misbehaving protocol code, some of these per-
missions can be revoked in order to prevent the code from unnoticeably
undermining its own security goals. This mechanism will be explained in
more detail further on.
The definitions for tracking principal identities during verification are
shown in Listing 3. For clarity, the different permissions that an identity
comprises are defined separately as the predicates network permission,
decryption permission and random permission. A principal iden-
tity then is defined in terms of these permissions, as a chunk of the pred-
icate principal. Its first argument is the sequence number in the line
of generated identities to ensure that each identity is unique. The second
argument keeps track of how many random values are generated for the
principal. The predicate principals is used to keep track of how many
identities are generated thus far as indicated by its only argument. To re-
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/*@
predicate network_permission(int principal;);
predicate decryption_permission(int principal;);
predicate random_permission(int principal, int generated_values;);
predicate principal(int principal, int generated_values;) =
network_permission(principal) &*&
decryption_permission(principal) &*&
random_permission(principal, generated_values)
;
predicate principals(int count);
require_module principals_mod;
lemma void principals_init();
requires module(principals_mod, true);
ensures principals(0);
lemma int principal_create();
requires principals(?count);
ensures principals(count + 1) &*& result == count + 1 &*&
principal(count + 1, 0);
@*/
Listing 3: Tracking principal identities and corresponding permissions
trieve the permission for generating identities (i.e. a chunk of the predicate
principals), the lemma principals init should be invoked. The
precondition of this lemma uses the module system of VeriFast (notice the
require module declaration) to ensure that the lemma can only be in-
voked once in order to prevent the recycling of identities. How exactly this
module system works is not explained here, but illustrative examples can
be found in the latest VeriFast release. With the permission for generat-
ing identities, one can start creating new identities by invoking the lemma
principal create.
Listing 4 illustrates how to use these definitions by showing a fragment
of the template from Subsection 2.1 that has been partially filled in. The
contract of role1 reflects that this implementation of a protocol role needs
access to a principal identity. Important to note here is that each piece of
protocol code should only have access to one principal identity. Otherwise
a misbehaving piece of protocol code which gets some of its identity per-
missions revoked (e.g. to prevent it from further using the network API,
see Subsection 2.3), can still fall back to another identity. This would
make our encoding of the extended symbolic model in VeriFast unsound
and is therefore not allowed in our approach. The main function in List-
ing 4 gets the permission to generate identities by invoking the lemma
principals init and generates two principal identities before launch-
ing the protocol. After the protocol has finished the identity permissions
are cleaned up through leak statements.
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//@ import_module principals_mod;
void role1()
//@ requires principal(?p1, ?random_values);
//@ ensures principal(p1, ?new_random_values);
{
//@ open principal(p1, random_values);
/* ... */
//@ close principal(p1, _);
}
int main(void)
//@ requires module(template, true);
//@ ensures true;
{
//@ open_module();
//@ principals_init();
// ... create a thread that executes the attacker implementation
while (true)
//@ invariant principals(_);
{
//@ int p1 = principal_create();
//@ int p2 = principal_create();
// ... launch protocol role threads
//@ leak principal(p1, _);
//@ leak principal(p2, _);
}
}
Listing 4: Illustration of using the definitions for principal identities
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2.3. The network API
An extract from the annotated network API is shown in Listing 5. The
C functions shown are obtained from the network API of PolarSSL and
they form a classical socket API. Specifications added to these C functions
ensure that verified code uses them in a correct fashion. For brevity, only
the C functions to establish a connection at client-side are shown. The
functions and contracts for server-side connections are analogous.
To establish a connection, a client first has to call the net connect
function with the correct arguments. If successful (i.e. the result of the call
is equal to zero), the client receives a chunk of the predicate net status.
As the postcondition of net connect indicates the third argument of this
chunk will be connection init. This reflects the fact that the initial-
ization of the socket is not complete after only calling net connect, since
the communication type still has to be set to blocking or non-blocking. So
the final step in initializing a client socket is calling net set block. For
simplicity we only support blocking communication, but non-blocking com-
munication could be easily added. After calling net set block the client
receives a chunk of the form net status( , , , connected) and he
can start sending and receiving messages via the corresponding socket using
the functions net send and net receive. The contracts of these send
and receive functions require the caller to have the permission to use the
network API (see Subsection 2.2) and a correctly initialized socket, i.e. a
chunk of the form net status(socket, , , connected). The ac-
tual messages sent and received are simply character buffers. Finally, the
function net close allows one to close a socket.
An example of how to use these functions is shown in Listing 6. A client
sets up a connection with a server at localhost (the default address if
the NULL address is given) on port 1234. Then, he sends and receives a
16 byte message before closing the connection. Note that the contract of
role1 expresses that it requires a principal identity and also note that
the first (ghost) statement in role1 opens this predicate chunk. Without
these provisions, this piece of code would not verify.
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/*@
inductive socket_status =
| bound_to_port | connection_init | connected;
predicate net_status(int socket, list<char> address,
int socket_port, socket_status status);
@*/
int net_connect(int *socket, const char *host, int port);
//@ requires integer(socket, _) &*& [?f]option_string(host, ?h);
/*@ ensures integer(socket, ?socket_v) &*&
[f]option_string(host, h) &*&
result != 0 ? true :
net_status(socket_v, h, port, connection_init); @*/
int net_set_block(int socket);
//@ requires net_status(socket, ?h, ?port, connection_init);
/*@ ensures result != 0 ? true :
net_status(socket, h, port, connected) ; @*/
int net_send(void *socket, const char *buf, size_t len);
/*@ requires network_permission(?id) &*&
integer(socket, ?socket_v) &*&
net_status(socket_v, ?ip, ?port, connected) &*&
len <= MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE &*&
[?f1]chars(buf, len, ?cs); @*/
/*@ ensures network_permission(id) &*&
integer(socket, socket_v) &*&
net_status(socket_v, ip, port, connected) &*&
[f1]chars(buf, len, cs); @*/
int net_recv(void *socket, char *buf, size_t len);
/*@ requires network_permission(?id) &*&
integer(socket, ?socket_v) &*&
net_status(socket_v, ?ip, ?port, connected) &*&
chars(buf, len, _) &*& len <= MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE; @*/
/*@ ensures network_permission(id) &*&
integer(socket, socket_v) &*&
net_status(socket_v, ip, port, connected) &*&
chars(buf, len, _) &*& result <= len; @*/
void net_close(int socket);
//@ requires net_status(socket, _, _, _);
//@ ensures true;
Listing 5: Extract from the annotated network API
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void role1()
//@ requires principal(?p1, ?random_values);
//@ ensures principal(p1, ?new_random_values);
{
//@ open principal(p1, random_values);
int socket;
char buffer[16];
if(net_connect(&socket, NULL, 1234) != 0) abort();
if(net_set_block(socket) != 0) abort();
/* ... */
net_send(&socket, buffer, 16);
net_recv(&socket, buffer, 16);
net_close(socket);
//@ close principal(p1, _);
}
Listing 6: Illustration of how to use the network API
2.4. Contracts for cryptographic primitives
In this subsection we introduce step-by-step all the definitions that are
required to specify the contract of a cryptographic primitive. At the end
we give contracts for four cryptographic primitives selected from PolarSSL:
• sha512 (hash generation)
• havege random (random value generation)
• gcm crypt and tag (authenticated encryption)
• gcm auth decrypt (authenticated decryption)
Cryptograms Before we can specify a contract for some cryptographic
primitive, we need a symbolic representation of the result of cryptographic
computations. We call these results cryptograms, i.e. instances of the in-
ductive datatype cryptogram defined in Listing 7. As mentioned in the
beginning of this section, we focus here on the generation of random val-
ues (i.e. symmetric keys and nonces), hashing and authenticated encryp-
tion. So in this scope cryptogram needs four constructors, while more
constructors are necessary in the full encoding of our extended symbolic
model.
The first constructor cg hash of the inductive datatype cryptogram
represents hash values and its only parameter pay serves to record the pay-
load that was used to create the hash. The second and third constructor
both represent random values and we make a distinction between symmet-
ric keys and nonces for clarity4. Each of these two constructors has two
parameters and a cg nonce(p,i) or cg symmetric key(p,i) cryp-
togram symbolizes the ith random value generated by principal p. Au-
thenticated encrypted messages then, are represented by the fourth con-
structor cg auth encrypted and this constructor has five parameters.
4 It also prevents keys from being used as nonces and vice versa.
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/*@
inductive cryptogram =
| cg_hash (list<char> payload)
| cg_nonce (int principal, int i)
| cg_symmetric_key (int principal, int i)
| cg_auth_encrypted (int principal, int i,
list<char> pay, list<char> iv)
;
@*/
Listing 7: Cryptograms are the results of cryptographic computations
The first two parameters serve to identify the key that was used and the
third parameter records the plaintext that was encrypted. The fourth pa-
rameter finally, allows for the same plaintext to be encrypted with the
same key to different ciphertexts. This is why an initialization vector is
used in symmetric encryption and so the parameter iv corresponds to the
initialization vector that was chosen to create the ciphertext.
It is instructive to contrast this definition of cryptogram with the def-
inition of messages in a regular symbolic model of cryptography. Such a
definition is shown in Listing 8 as the inductive datatype msg. It is only
shown there to compare the two representations and it is not part of our
approach. A clear similarity between these two definitions is the repre-
sentation of nonces and symmetric keys. An obvious difference between
the two is that there is no pairing operator to compose two cryptograms
in our extended symbolic model while msg has the constructor msg pair
to compose messages. Another obvious difference is that cryptogram,
in contrast to msg, has no msg data constructor because plain messages
simply have the type list<char> in the encoding of our extended sym-
bolic model. The constructors msg hash and msg auth encrypted on
the one hand and their corresponding constructors of cryptogram on the
other hand finally, are very similar in both definitions except that they
differ in the type for their payloads. In the definition of msg this type
is msg itself and so the definition of messages is a true recursive defini-
tion. The definition of cryptogram on the other hand is not recursive
since the payload in the constructor cg auth encrypted has the type
list<char>. So in our extended symbolic model from the definition of
cryptogram alone it is not immediately clear how to, for example, en-
crypt a key or compose two encrypted messages into one message. This
will however become clear during the rest of this section.
Character representation of a cryptogram: chars for cg In the con-
tract for a cryptographic primitive, we want to link the contents of a
C buffer to some symbolic result produced by that cryptographic prim-
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/*@
inductive msg =
| msg_data (list<char> raw_data)
| msg_pair (msg fst, msg snd)
| msg_hash (msg payload)
| msg_nonce (int principal, int i)
| msg_symmetric_key (int principal, int i)
| msg_auth_encrypted (int principal, int i,
msg payload, list<char> iv)
;
@*/
Listing 8: Messages in classic symbolic models: NOT part of approach
//@ fixpoint list<char> chars_for_cg(cryptogram cg);
Listing 9: Character representation of a cryptogram
itive (i.e. a cryptogram). As a first step we define the pure function
chars for cg in Listing 9. This function returns the exact character
representation for a given cryptogram. It is initially completely unspeci-
fied, but its function values are determined during symbolic execution by
the postconditions of the cryptographic primitive implementations (as dis-
cussed further on). Suppose the primitive for random value generation
outputs, in a C buffer, the character representation cs of a symbolic cryp-
togram key as Figure 2 illustrates. Then we know chars for cg(key)
is equal to cs.
Properties of chars for cg In the encoding of our extended symbolic
model, we chose to give the character representation of cryptograms a
surjectivity and an injectivity property. These properties are encoded in
Listing 11 and Listing 12 respectively as lemmas about chars for cg.
The injectivity property’s main purpose is to simplify the rest of the ap-
proach. The surjectivity property of chars for cg does not only simplify
the rest of the approach, it is also a very useful property when verifying
code that parses and interprets raw messages received from the network
(see Subsection 2.5).
Before we discuss these properties of chars for cg, we give some
CS
key
cs = chars for cg(key)
Figure 2: Illustration of the intended meaning of chars for cg
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/*@
inductive tag =
| tag_hash
| tag_nonce
| tag_symmetric_key
| tag_auth_encrypted
;
fixpoint tag tag_for_cg(cryptogram cg)
{
switch(cg)
{
case cg_hash(pay1):
return tag_hash;
case cg_nonce(p1, c1):
return tag_nonce;
case cg_symmetric_key(p1, c1):
return tag_symmetric_key;
case cg_auth_encrypted(p1, c1, cs1, ent1):
return tag_auth_encrypted;
}
}
@*/
Listing 10: Associate a tag which each kind of cryptogram
/*@
lemma cryptogram chars_for_cg_sur(list<char> cs, tag t);
requires true;
ensures t == tag_for_cg(result) &*&
cs == chars_for_cg(result);
@*/
Listing 11: Surjectivity of the character representation of cryptograms
straightforward definitions in Listing 10 that allow to differentiate between
the different kinds of cryptograms. The inductive datatype tag is defined
there which has one constructor for each kind of cryptogram. Since none
of these constructors has any parameters, we have in fact a unique tag for
each constructor of cryptogram. The pure function tag for cg then
associates the correct tag with each kind of cryptogram.
In Listing 11 the straightforward surjectivity property of chars for cg
is expressed. The lemma chars for cg sur simply allows to interpret
a list of characters as a particular kind of cryptogram. For simplicity, we
allow to interpret any list of characters (e.g. also the empty list) as the
character representation of some kind of cryptogram. As there are infinitely
many cryptograms that will never be generated by the cryptographic prim-
itives (due to negative principal identifiers or out of range character values
in a payload) and since chars for cg sur can map each list that is not
generated by a primitive to such a cryptogram, one can conclude that this
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/*@
fixpoint bool col();
lemma void chars_for_cg_inj(cryptogram cg1, cryptogram cg2);
requires tag_for_cg(cg1) == tag_for_cg(cg2) &*&
chars_for_cg(cg1) == chars_for_cg(cg2);
ensures col || cg1 == cg2;
@*/
Listing 12: Injectivity of the character representation of cryptograms
poses no soundness issues.
The injectivity property of chars for cg is captured by the lemma
chars for cg inj from Listing 12. It expresses that if the character
representations of two cryptograms of the same kind are equal, then the
corresponding cryptograms must also be equal or a cryptographic collision
occurred. A cryptographic collision, signaled by the boolean function col,
occurs when during a specific run of a protocol:
• a hash collision is found
• the primitive for random value generation produces the same character
array twice
• the same ciphertext is computed when the encryption primitive is in-
voked twice with a different key, plaintext and/or initialization vector
as input
Cryptographic collisions should be extremely rare events for primitives that
are well-implemented 5.
Memory regions containing secrets The result of a cryptographic prim-
itive could be a secret (e.g. a session key), and we want to prevent leaking
secrets to the attacker. For this reason we are going to treat C buffers where
cryptographic primitives store their results in a special way. Permissions
of C buffers are normally tracked by chunks of the predicate chars as de-
clared in Listing 13. A chunk chars(buffer, n, cs) for example, in-
dicates that there is a valid allocated memory region starting at the address
buffer with a size of n bytes and with content cs. The owner of such a
chunk has the permission to read and write the indicated memory region.
We now also introduce the very similar predicate crypto chars. The dif-
ference with the chars predicate is that memory regions expressed by such
5 By stating that a collision should be rare, we mean that protocol implementations that force
col to be true in all symbolic execution branches during verification by using the lemma
chars for cg inj, should have a run time complexity that is exponential in the output size
of the cryptographic primitive used to force the collision. An example of such an implementation
is one that generates so many keys that the key space gets exhausted; i.e. for keys of n bits, it
generates at least 2n keys. As the values of chars for cg are only fixed in the postconditions
of the cryptographic primitives such exhaustion is the only way to force col to be true. To cope
with non-terminating protocols, we only consider all finite prefixes of protocol runs.
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/*@
predicate chars(char *buffer, int n; list<char> cs);
inductive crypto_chars_kind =
| normal
| secret
;
predicate crypto_chars(crypto_chars_kind kind,
char *buffer, int n; list<char> cs);
@*/
Listing 13: Chars vs. crypto chars: possible confidentiality of memory
a crypto chars chunk contain possibly secret cryptographic information
and such a memory region is neither readable nor writable directly.
Chunks of the predicate crypto chars come in two flavors and what
flavor a chunk belongs to depends on its first argument. A crypto chars
chunk where the first argument is normal is equivalent to a regular chars
chunk. This means it can be converted to a chars chunk and back with the
lemmas crypto chars to chars and chars to crypto chars from
Listing 14 respectively. Only when it is converted to a chars chunk does
one obtain read and write permissions to the corresponding memory re-
gion. In normal circumstances (i.e. if no cryptographic collision occurs),
a crypto chars chunk where the first argument is secret can only
be converted to a chars chunk after one has proven that its content
is not secret (how to do this is discussed in Subsection 2.5). This im-
portant restriction prevents actual secret information from leaking into
regular program variables or into the program’s control flow. Such a
secret crypto chars chunk can also be converted to a chars chunk
with the lemma crypto chars to chars if a cryptographic collision
occurs. This poses no problem as we prove all our protocol properties
“up to a collision”, meaning that the proven properties only hold for a
specific protocol run if no cryptographic collision occurred. The lemma
chars to secret crypto chars finally, allows to convert any chars
chunk to a secret crypto chars chunk.
Cryptograms in memory Now we are ready to establish a link between
a symbolic cryptogram and an actual C buffer. We do this via a predicate
with the overloaded name cryptogram defined in Listing 15. The body
of this definition reads as follows: “The possibly secret memory region of
length n starting at address buffer is not only correctly allocated, its con-
tents cs is also the character representation of the generated cryptogram
cg.” The concept of generated cryptograms is important for providing an
induction principle for cryptograms which is discussed in Subsection 2.7.
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/*@
lemma_auto void crypto_chars_to_chars(char *array, int n);
requires [?f]crypto_chars(?kind, array, n, ?cs) &*&
col || kind == normal;
ensures [f]chars(array, n, cs);
lemma_auto void chars_to_crypto_chars(char *array, int n);
requires [?f]chars(array, n, ?cs);
ensures [f]crypto_chars(normal, array, n, cs);
lemma_auto void chars_to_secret_crypto_chars(char *array, int n);
requires [?f]chars(array, n, ?cs);
ensures [f]crypto_chars(secret, array, n, cs);
@*/
Listing 14: Some conversions between chars and crypto chars
/*@
fixpoint bool cg_is_generated(cryptogram cg);
predicate cryptogram(char* array, int n, list<char> cs,
cryptogram cg) =
crypto_chars(secret, array, n, cs) &*&
cs == chars_for_cg(cg) && cg_is_generated(cg)
;
@*/
Listing 15: Expressing the cryptographic content of a C buffer
Primitive for hash generation The first annotated cryptographic primi-
tive we discuss is sha512 and it is by far the simplest one. It is shown in
Listing 16 and is used to generate hash values. The caller of the primitive
should provide, besides a valid allocated output buffer, an input buffer ex-
pressed by a crypto chars chunk. Depending on the chosen value for
is384 the output buffer must have a size of 48 or 64 bytes to keep the
computed hash value. In the postcondition the predicate cryptogram
is used to indicate that after an invocation of sha512, the output buffer
is a memory region linked to the cryptogram hash(cs pay). The fact
that the input buffer is expressed by a crypto chars chunk, enables the
generation of hash values from possibly confidential data.
void sha512(const char *in, size_t ilen, char* out, int is384);
/*@ requires [?f]crypto_chars(?kind, in, ilen, ?cs_pay) &*&
chars(out, ?olen, _) &*&
is384 == 0 && olen == 64 ||
is384 == 1 && olen == 48; @*/
/*@ ensures [f]crypto_chars(kind, in, ilen, cs_pay) &*&
cryptogram(out, olen, _, cg_hash(cs_pay)); @*/
Listing 16: A cryptographic primitive to generate hash values
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void role1()
//@ requires principal(?p1, ?random_values);
//@ ensures principal(p1, ?new_random_values);
{
char msg[1024];
/* ... */
//@ chars_to_crypto_chars(msg, 1024);
//@ assert crypto_chars(normal, msg, 1024, ?cs);
char* hash = malloc(64); if (hash == 0) abort();
sha512(msg, 1024, hash, 0);
/* ... */
//@ leak cryptogram(hash, 64, ?hash_cs, cg_hash(cs));
//@ leak malloc_block(hash, 64);
}
Listing 17: Example of generating a hash value
An example of how to correctly invoke sha512 is given in Listing 17.
There, a hash value is calculated from the content of the buffer msg. First
the lemma chars to crypto chars is invoked to convert the chars
chunk that tracks the buffer msg to a crypto chars chunk. Subse-
quently a buffer hash is allocated for the primitive to store its computed
hash value. After checking that the call to malloc succeeded, sha512
is invoked to compute the hash value from the content of the buffer msg.
Finally, the heap is cleaned up through some leak statements instead of by
freeing the computed hash value. How to correctly free possibly confiden-
tial crypto chars chunks is explained in Subsection 2.5.
Primitive for random value generation The annotated primitive for ran-
dom value generation, havege random is shown in Listing 19. To invoke
this primitive, an initialized havege state structure is required. One can
initialize such a structure with the function havege init from Listing 18.
The contract of this function takes a havege state chunk and transforms
it into a havege state initialized chunk. Once all necessary ran-
dom values are generated, the initialized structure can be discarded via the
function havege free, also from Listing 18.
With an initialized havege state structure one can start generating
random values. As the precondition of havege random in Listing 19 in-
dicates, also a permission to generate random values is required. This per-
mission takes the form of a chunk of the predicate random permission
as discussed in Subsection 2.2. The caller of havege random must also
provide a random request chunk primarily to pass the ghost arguments
info and key request. Since we differentiate between keys and nonces,
the caller has to indicate if he wants to generate a key or a nonce. He
can do exactly this with the parameter key request. The info pa-
rameter allows to associate some custom information with the resulting
cryptogram by choosing the function value of cg info. Function values
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struct havege_state{ /* ... */ };
typedef struct havege_state havege_state;
//@ predicate havege_state(havege_state *state) = true /* &*&...*/;
//@ predicate havege_state_initialized(havege_state *state);
void havege_init(havege_state *havege_state);
//@ requires havege_state(havege_state);
//@ ensures havege_state_initialized(havege_state);
void havege_free(havege_state *havege_state);
//@ requires havege_state_initialized(havege_state);
//@ ensures havege_state(havege_state);
Listing 18: Initializing and freeing a context for random values
/*@ predicate random_request(int principal, int info,
bool key_request) = true; @*/
//@ fixpoint int cg_info(cryptogram cg);
int havege_random(void *havege_state, char *output, size_t len);
/*@ requires [?f]havege_state_initialized(havege_state) &*&
random_request(?principal, ?info, ?key_request) &*&
random_permission(principal, ?count) &*&
chars(output, len, _) &*& len >= MIN_KEY_SIZE; @*/
/*@ ensures [f]havege_state_initialized(havege_state) &*&
random_permission(principal, count + 1) &*&
result == 0 ?
cryptogram(output, len, ?cs, ?cg) &*&
info == cg_info(cg) &*&
key_request ?
cg == cg_symmetric_key(principal, count + 1)
:
cg == cg_nonce(principal, count + 1)
:
chars(output, len, _); @*/
Listing 19: A cryptographic primitive to generate random values
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void role1()
//@ requires principal(?p1, ?random_values);
//@ ensures principal(p1, ?new_random_values);
{
//@ open principal(p1, random_values);
/* ... */
havege_state state;
//@ close havege_state(&state);
havege_init(&state);
char* key = malloc(16); if (key == 0) abort();
//@ close random_request(p1, 1234, true);
if (havege_random(&state, key, 16) != 0) abort();
/* ... */
//@ leak cryptogram(key, 16, ?key_cs, ?key_cg);
//@ leak malloc_block(key, 16);
//@ assert key_cg == cg_symmetric_key(p1, random_values + 1);
//@ assert cg_info(key_cg) == 1234;
havege_free(&state);
//@ open havege_state(&state);
/* ... */
//@ close principal(p1, _);
}
Listing 20: Example of generating a random key
of cg info are important when proving authentication properties of pro-
tocol implementations (see Section 3). The last requirement imposed by
the precondition then, is a correctly allocated output buffer. If the result
of a call to havege random is successful (i.e. the return value is equal
to zero), then the postcondition ensures that the content of the output
buffer is linked to the proper cryptogram and that this cryptogram has
the correct information associated with it. Note that in the postcondition
of havege random the second argument of the random permission
chunk is incremented to ensure that all generated random values are linked
with a distinct symbolic cryptogram.
A small example of how to generate a key with all these definitions is
shown in Listing 20. First a havege state structure is initialized and a
memory buffer for the key is allocated. Then a random request chunk
is created for generating a key by closing the predicate with the chosen
information 1234. Subsequently the actual call to havege random pro-
duces the key in the provided output buffer. After that call, the heap
is again cleaned up through some leak statements and two assert state-
ments illustrate some important properties of havege random. Finally,
the havege state structure is freed.
Primitives for authenticated encryption and decryption The most in-
teresting primitives discussed here are the authenticated encryption and
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struct gcm_context{ /*...*/ };
typedef struct gcm_context gcm_context;
//@ predicate gcm_context(gcm_context *context) = true /* &*&...*/;
/*@ predicate gcm_context_initialized(gcm_context *context,
int principal, int count);@*/
int gcm_init(gcm_context *ctx, int cipher,
const char *key, unsigned int keysize);
/*@ requires [?f]cryptogram(key, ?size_key, ?cs_key, ?cg_key) &*&
keysize == size_key * 8 &*&
cg_key == cg_symmetric_key(?p, ?c) &*&
gcm_context(ctx) &*&
cipher == POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_AES &*&
(keysize == 128 || keysize == 192
|| keysize == 256); @*/
/*@ ensures [f]cryptogram(key, size_key, cs_key, cg_key) &*&
result == 0 ?
gcm_context_initialized(ctx, p, c)
:
gcm_context(ctx); @*/
void gcm_free(gcm_context *ctx);
//@ requires gcm_context_initialized(ctx, _, _);
//@ ensures gcm_context(ctx);
Listing 21: Initialize or free a context for authenticated encryption
decryption primitives shown in Listing 22 and Listing 23 respectively. As
was the case for the primitive for generating random values, also for these
primitives some structure must be initialized before they can be invoked.
More specifically a gcm context structure must be initialized with a
generated key. This can be accomplished with the function gcm init
from Listing 21. While the gcm module of PolarSSL for authenticated
encryption supports multiple ciphers, we chose to only write specifica-
tions for the AES6 cipher for conciseness. This is reflected by the fact
that we force the cipher argument of a call to gcm init to be equal to
POLARSSL CIPHER ID AES in the precondition. The precondition also re-
quires, besides a correctly generated key, that the length of that key is 128
bits, 192 bits or 256 bits as is required by the AES cipher. A successful call
to gcm init results in a proper initialized gcm context structure that
later can be cleaned up with the function gcm free also from Listing 21.
The authenticated encryption primitive gcm crypt and tag is shown
in Listing 22. This primitive of PolarSSL can also be directly used for
decryption (instead of the one shown in Listing 23), but we chose for con-
ciseness to go for a contract that only allows encryption. Therefore the
precondition requires the mode argument to be equal to GCM ENCRYPT.
6 Advanced Encryption Standard (FIPS PUB 197, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/
fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf)
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The precondition also requires the permission to generate random values
and this has to do with the 16-byte initialization vector (IV). Since it
is important to randomly generate a fresh initialization vector for each
encryption, the contract of gcm crypt and tag enforces this using the
random permission chunk. More specifically the assertion iv cs ==
chars for cg(cg nonce(p2, c2)) forces the buffer iv to contain a
freshly generated nonce and the increment of c2 in the postcondition pre-
vents the same nonce from being reused. The remaining part of the precon-
dition describes the required input and output buffers. Since this primitive
performs authenticated encryption, also a buffer to write the authentica-
tion tag or message authentication code (MAC) is required. The imple-
mentation of gcm crypt and tag also allows some non-encrypted data,
identified by the parameters add and add len, to be included in the com-
putation of this authentication tag. For simplicity our specification does
not support this. The postcondition finally, returns all the updated per-
missions and links the authentication tag buffer and the output buffer to
the correct cg auth encrypted cryptogram. More precisely, the char-
acter representation of the produced symbolic cryptogram enc cg is the
concatenation of the authentication tag and the encrypted output. Differ-
ent choices could be made here, but this relieves us from having to enforce
a minimum input size for authenticated encryption as is required for nor-
mal symmetric encryption (see Appendix A). We also could have chosen
to combine the authentication tag buffer and the output buffer into one
single continuous buffer and use the predicate cryptogram to describe
its symbolic content as is done in the contracts of the previously discussed
primitives. For flexibility and to support the verification of preexisting code
however, we decided to keep these two as distinct buffers. Note that the
buffers for the encrypted output, the authentication tag and the IV have
become secret crypto chars chunks. Indeed, as their updated con-
tents is correlated with the key and input to gcm crypt and tag, they
could contain secret data7.
The contract for the primitive for authenticated decryption shown in
Listing 23 is very analogous. To decrypt an encrypted message, the IV
that was input to encryption and the tag that was output of encryption
must be provided. The postcondition simply states that if authenticated
decryption was successful and no cryptographic collision occurred, then
the correct IV and tag were supplied and the output is the payload of the
presented encrypted message.
Listing 24 finally, shows a code snippet that correctly encrypts a message.
The setting up of the environment for encryption is quite straightforward:
a fresh random nonce is generated, it is ensured that the input buffer is
described by a crypto chars chunk and a gcm context is initialized.
7 This is actually a crude measure. If both the key and input are not secret, the resulting authenti-
cation tag, encrypted message and IV are also not secret. The complete encoding of our extended
symbolic model takes this fact into account.
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int gcm_crypt_and_tag(gcm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length,
const char *iv, size_t iv_len,
const char *add, size_t add_len,
const char *input, char *output,
size_t tag_len, char *tag);
/*@ requires gcm_context_initialized(ctx, ?p1, ?c1) &*&
mode == GCM_ENCRYPT &*&
random_permission(?p2, ?c2) &*&
crypto_chars(?iv_kind, iv, iv_len, ?iv_cs) &*&
iv_len == 16 &*&
iv_cs == chars_for_cg(cg_nonce(p2, c2)) &*&
add == NULL &*& add_len == 0 &*&
[?f]crypto_chars(?kind, input, length, ?in_cs) &*&
chars(tag, tag_len, _) &*& tag_len == 16 &*&
chars(output, length, _); @*/
/*@ ensures gcm_context_initialized(ctx, p1, c1) &*&
random_permission(p2, c2 + 1) &*&
crypto_chars(secret, iv, iv_len, _) &*&
[f]crypto_chars(kind, input, length, in_cs) &*&
crypto_chars(secret, tag, tag_len, ?tag_cs) &*&
crypto_chars(secret, output, length, ?out_cs) &*&
result != 0 ? true :
exists(?enc_cg) &*& cg_is_generated(enc_cg) &&
append(tag_cs, out_cs) == chars_for_cg(enc_cg) &*&
enc_cg == cg_auth_encrypted(p1, c1,
in_cs, iv_cs); @*/
Listing 22: A cryptographic primitive for authenticated encryption
Then the input buffer msg is encrypted before the gcm context structure
is freed. After the heap is cleaned up through some leak statements, the C
function in the example returns.
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int gcm_auth_decrypt(gcm_context *ctx, size_t length,
const char *iv, size_t iv_len,
const char *add, size_t add_len,
const char *tag, size_t tag_len,
const char *input, char *output);
/*@ requires gcm_context_initialized(ctx, ?p1, ?c1) &*&
crypto_chars(?iv_kind, iv, iv_len, ?iv_cs) &*&
iv_len == 16 &*&
add == NULL &*& add_len == 0 &*&
[?f1]crypto_chars(?kind, tag, tag_len, ?tag_cs) &*&
tag_len == 16 &*&
[?f2]crypto_chars(kind, input, length, ?in_cs) &*&
exists(?in_cg) &*&
append(tag_cs, in_cs) == chars_for_cg(in_cg) &*&
in_cg == cg_auth_encrypted(?p2, ?c2,
?out_cs2, ?iv_cs2) &*&
chars(output, length, _); @*/
/*@ ensures gcm_context_initialized(ctx, p1, c1) &*&
[f1]crypto_chars(kind, tag, tag_len, tag_cs) &*&
[f2]crypto_chars(kind, input, length, in_cs) &*&
crypto_chars(secret, output, length, ?out_cs) &*&
crypto_chars(secret, iv, iv_len, _) &*&
result != 0 ? true :
col || (p1 == p2 && c1 == c2 &&
iv_cs == iv_cs2 && out_cs == out_cs2); @*/
Listing 23: A cryptographic primitive for authenticated decryption
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void role1(havege_state *state, char *key)
/*@ requires principal(?p1, ?random_values) &*&
havege_state_initialized(state) &*&
[?f1]cryptogram(key, 16, ?key_cs, ?key_cg) &*&
key_cg == cg_symmetric_key(?p2, ?id2); @*/
/*@ ensures principal(p1, ?new_random_values) &*&
havege_state_initialized(state) &*&
[f1]cryptogram(key, 16, key_cs, key_cg); @*/
{
gcm_context gcm_context;
char msg[1024];
char* enc = malloc(1040); if (enc == 0) abort();
char* iv = malloc(16); if (iv == 0) abort();
//@ open principal(p1, random_values);
/* ... */
//@ close random_request(p1, 0, false);
if (havege_random(state, iv, 16) != 0) abort();
//@ open cryptogram(iv, 16, _, _);
//@ chars_to_crypto_chars(msg, 1024);
//@ close gcm_context(&gcm_context);
if (gcm_init(&gcm_context, POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_AES, key,
(unsigned int) 16 * 8) != 0) abort();
if (gcm_crypt_and_tag(&gcm_context, GCM_ENCRYPT,
(unsigned int) 1024, iv, 16, NULL, 0,
msg, enc + 16, 16, enc) != 0)
abort();
gcm_free(&gcm_context);
//@ open gcm_context(&gcm_context);
/* ... */
//@ assert exists(?enc_cg);
//@ crypto_chars_join(enc);
//@ close cryptogram(enc, 1040, _, enc_cg);
//@ leak cryptogram(enc, 1040, _, enc_cg);
//@ leak malloc_block(enc, 1040);
//@ leak crypto_chars(_, iv, 16, _);
//@ leak malloc_block(iv, 16);
//@ crypto_chars_to_chars(msg, 1024);
//@ close principal(p1, _);
}
Listing 24: Example of encrypting a message
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/*@
lemma void crypto_chars_split(char *array, int i);
requires [?f]crypto_chars(?kind, array, ?n, ?cs) &*&
0 <= i &*& i <= n;
ensures [f]crypto_chars(kind, array, i, ?cs1) &*&
[f]crypto_chars(kind, array + i, n - i, ?cs2) &*&
cs1 == take(i, cs) &*& cs2 == drop(i, cs) &*&
cs == append(cs1, cs2);
lemma_auto void crypto_chars_join(char *array);
requires [?f]crypto_chars(?kind, array, ?n, ?cs) &*&
[f]crypto_chars(kind, array + n, ?n0, ?cs0);
ensures [f]crypto_chars(kind, array, n + n0, append(cs, cs0));
@*/
Listing 25: Splitting and joining possibly confidential memory regions
void memcpy(void *dst, void *src, size_t count);
/*@ requires chars(dst, count, ?cs) &*&
[?f]crypto_chars(?kind, src, count, ?cs0); @*/
/*@ ensures crypto_chars(kind, dst, count, cs0) &*&
[f]crypto_chars(kind, src, count, cs0); @*/
Listing 26: A contract for memcpy
2.5. Reasoning about buffers that contain secrets
As explained in the previous subsection, the result of a cryptographic prim-
itive is written in a buffer described by a crypto chars chunk (see List-
ing 13). Also the contracts of the primitives for hashing and authenticated
encryption expect an input buffer that is described by a crypto chars
chunk. This is to enable the hashing and encryption of possible secrets. The
contents of such a buffer described by a crypto chars chunk cannot be
read until it is converted to a normal chars chunk. If the first argument of
a crypto chars is normal this conversion is easy, but if it is secret one
first needs to prove that it does not contain any secrets. Before we explain
how to prove that the conversion from a secret crypto chars chunk to
a chars chunk is allowed, we show how to combine possibly secret memory
regions into a single memory region described by a crypto chars chunk.
This composing of memory regions is necessary to construct a payload that
contains secrets as input for hashing or encryption.
Composing possibly secret memory regions As explained in the Veri-
Fast Tutorial [4], two separately tracked adjacent character buffers can be
merged together with a lemma called chars join and any tracked charac-
ter buffer can be split into two with the lemma chars split. Listing 25
shows the crypto chars counterparts of these lemmas.
A first step in creating a single memory region from different arbitrary
parts then, is to create crypto chars chunks for the desired memory re-
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void compose(char* fst, char* snd, char* out)
/*@ requires chars(fst, SIZE, ?cs1) &*&
crypto_chars(?kind, snd, 2 * SIZE, ?cs2) &*&
chars(out, 2 * SIZE, _); @*/
/*@ ensures chars(fst, SIZE, cs1) &*&
crypto_chars(kind, snd, 2 * SIZE, cs2) &*&
crypto_chars(kind, out, 2 * SIZE,
append(cs1, take(SIZE, cs2))); @*/
{
//@ chars_limits(out);
//@ chars_to_crypto_chars(fst, SIZE);
memcpy(out, fst, SIZE);
/*@ switch(kind)
{
case secret:
chars_to_secret_crypto_chars(out, SIZE);
case normal:
}
@*/
//@ crypto_chars_split(snd, SIZE);
memcpy(out + SIZE, snd, SIZE);
//@ crypto_chars_join(snd);
//@ crypto_chars_join(out);
}
Listing 27: Example using definitions from Listing 25 and Listing 26
gions with the lemmas crypto chars split and crypto chars join.
The next step is to copy these parts to adjacent regions in memory before
they can be merged with the lemma crypto chars join as a final step.
In many C programs, and also in our approach, this copying is done with
the function memcpy from the C standard library. Listing 26 shows a con-
tract for memcpy that can handle crypto chars chunks. This contract
simply states that after a call to memcpy, the content of the input buffer
src is copied to the output buffer dst and the output buffer is described
by the same kind of chunk as the input buffer was described with before
the call.
Listing 27 shows a small verified example that uses all these definitions.
In this example, the content of a non-confidential buffer of SIZE bytes
at location fst is concatenated with the first SIZE bytes of a possibly
confidential buffer at location snd. The result of this concatenation is
written in the output buffer out. While most of this example speaks for
itself, the first statement invokes the lemma chars limits and is required
to assure VeriFast that no overflow occurs in the expression out + SIZE.
More details on this can be found in [4].
Tracking cryptographic content of memory regions To prove that a
composed buffer described by a crypto chars chunk does not contain
any secrets, we need a way to track the cryptographic content of that
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cs1
key1
cs2
key2
cs3
key3
cs1 cs2 cs3
cgs in chars(cs1++cs2++cs3) =
{key1, key2, key3}
Figure 3: Illustration of the intended meaning of cgs in chars
/*@
fixpoint list<cryptogram> cgs_in_chars(list<char> cs);
lemma_auto void cg_constraints(cryptogram cg);
requires true;
ensures cons(cg, nil) == cgs_in_chars(chars_for_cg(cg));
@*/
Listing 28: Exact cryptographic information in a character buffer
buffer while composing it. In Subsection 2.4 we introduced the pure func-
tion chars for cg to express the cryptographic content of a buffer in
which some primitive wrote its result. Suppose now we have the situation
depicted in Figure 3. To describe the cryptographic content of a buffer
composed of bits and pieces of buffers in one-to-one correspondence with a
cryptogram, the function chars for cg seems insufficient. For this reason
we introduce the function cgs in chars from Listing 28, which identifies
for each list of characters the minimal set of cryptograms of which infor-
mation is present in the list. Although the situation depicted in Figure 3
is somewhat contrived, a dishonest principal can decide to leak different
pieces of cryptographic information in this way (more on the attacker model
in Subsection 2.6). Moreover, during the parsing of messages it is not yet
known which cryptographic information is in the message, and a function
like cgs in chars allows to express relationships between different parts
of the message and the whole message. Also defined in Listing 28, lemma
cg constraints expresses the fairly straightforward property that the
cryptographic information in the character representation of a cryptogram
is simply that cryptogram itself.
Now suppose we have the situation depicted in Figure 4. Here a con-
catenation of two buffers each containing a key is split somewhere at ran-
dom. What can we say about the cryptographic content of the resulting
buffers? We cannot use the function cgs in chars to say that both re-
sulting buffers contain information about both keys. At leas one of the
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cs1 cs2
key1 key2
cs1 cs2
cgs in chars bound(cs1,
{ key1, key2 })
cgs in chars bound(cs2,
{ key1, key2 })
Figure 4: Illustration of the intended meaning of cgs in chars bound
/*@
fixpoint bool cgs_in_chars_bound(list<char> cs,
list<cryptogram> cgs);
lemma void cgs_in_chars_bound(list<char> cs);
requires true;
ensures true == cgs_in_chars_bound(cs, cgs_in_chars(cs));
lemma void cgs_in_chars_bound_split(list<char> cs,
list<cryptogram> cgs, int i);
requires 0 <= i &*& i <= length(cs) &&
cgs_in_chars_bound(cs, cgs);
ensures true == cgs_in_chars_bound(take(i, cs), cgs) &*&
true == cgs_in_chars_bound(drop(i, cs), cgs);
lemma void cgs_in_chars_bound_join(
list<char> cs1, list<cryptogram> cgs1,
list<char> cs2, list<cryptogram> cgs2);
requires true == cgs_in_chars_bound(cs1, cgs1) &*&
true == cgs_in_chars_bound(cs2, cgs2);
ensures true == cgs_in_chars_bound(append(cs1, cs2),
union(cgs1, cgs2));
@*/
Listing 29: Upper bounds on cryptographic information
two resulting buffers will contain information about just one of the keys.
We introduce the function cgs in chars bound to deal with this situ-
ation. This function identifies valid upper bounds on the exact crypto-
graphic information exposed by a list of characters. The first lemma in
Listing 29, which is also named cgs in chars bound, expresses that the
exact cryptographic content of a C buffer is also a valid upper bound.
Lemma cgs in chars bound split and cgs in chars bound join
then allow to track this upper bound while splitting and joining C buffers.
From secret crypto chars to chars The main mechanism to prove
the functional correctness of a cryptographic protocol implementation is
an invariant as in [1, 2, 3]. Instead of enforcing this invariant on public
messages on the network, we enforce this invariant on readable memory
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/*@
predicate example_pub(cryptogram cg) =
switch (cg)
{
case cg_hash(pay0):
return true /* &*& ...*/;
case cg_nonce(p0, c0):
return true /* &*& ...*/;
case cg_symmetric_key(p0, c0):
return true /* &*& ...*/;
case cg_auth_encrypted(p0, c0, pay0, iv0):
return true /* &*& ...*/;
}
;
@*/
Listing 30: Example of an invariant definition
regions, i.e. memory regions tracked by a chars chunk and thus containing
no secrets. Since the network API discussed in Subsection 2.3 only accepts
a memory region described by a chars chunk, our invariant indirectly
holds for all the messages on the network. On top of that, our invariant
also holds for any memory that can influence the control flow of a protocol
implementation. Hence, even through implicit channels, only memory for
which the invariant holds can leak to the attacker.
For each verified protocol implementation a custom invariant is required
that specifies what cryptographic information is public or, equivalently,
non-secret. A good invariant must encode the accumulated knowledge
in each message during the execution of a protocol and custom events
combined with the information associated with a cryptogram (see Sub-
section 2.4) are particularly convenient to express this (the example in
Section 3 will clarify this). In our approach cryptograms are the symbolic
representation of cryptographic information, so our invariant has to be de-
fined in terms of which cryptograms are public. Listing 30 shows a trivial
invariant defined as a the predicate example pub.
The definitions in Listing 31 then allow to prove that a specific memory
region does only contain public cryptograms and hence no secrets. When
initializing our cryptographic library in the main function of the template
from Subsection 2.1, the custom defined invariant must be provided. This
is realized by calling the lemma public invariant init as illustrated
by the example in Listing 32. VeriFast’s module system is used here again
to ensure that this lemma can only be invoked once. Such an invocation of
public invariant init results in a public invar dummy chunk and
all threads implementing a protocol participant should receive a dummy
fraction of this chunk as also illustrated in Figure 32. This public invar
chunk is a necessary permission to call the lemma public crypto chars
that can transform a crypto chars chunk to a chars chunk.
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/*@
require_module public_invariant_mod;
predicate_ctor public_generated(predicate(cryptogram) pub)
(list<char> cs) =
[_]dummy_foreach(cgs_in_chars(cs), pub) &*&
true == forall(cgs_in_chars(cs), cg_is_generated)
;
predicate public_invar(predicate(cryptogram) pub);
lemma void public_invariant_init(predicate(cryptogram) pub);
requires module(public_invariant_mod, true);
ensures [_]public_invar(pub);
lemma void public_crypto_chars(char *array, int n);
requires [_]public_invar(?pub) &*&
[?f]crypto_chars(_, array, n, ?cs) &*&
[_]public_generated(pub)(cs);
ensures [f]chars(array, n, cs);
lemma void public_chars(char *array, int n);
requires [_]public_invar(?pub) &*&
[?f]chars(array, n, ?cs);
ensures [f]chars(array, n, cs) &*&
[_]public_generated(pub)(cs);
@*/
Listing 31: Protocol-speficic confidentiality
//@ import_module public_invariant_mod;
void role1()
//@ requires [_]public_invar(example_pub) /* &*& ... */;
//@ ensures true;
{ /* ... */ }
/* ... */
int main(void)
//@ requires module(template, true);
//@ ensures true;
{
//@ open_module();
//@ public_invariant_init(example_pub);
// ...
return 0;
}
Listing 32: Initializing the API for proving non-confidentiality
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However, the lemma public crypto chars also requires a proof that
the content of the crypto chars chunk does not contain any secret cryp-
tographic information. The caller has to provide this proof in the form
of a chunk of the predicate public generated(pub) which is an in-
stance of the predicate constructor public generated for the invariant
pub (see [4] for an explanation of predicate constructors). To create such a
chunk one must prove that each cryptogram that is (perhaps only partially)
present in the buffer, as determined by cgs in chars:
• satisfies the invariant
• was generated by calling a cryptographic primitive (this is important
for providing an induction principle for cryptograms in Subsection 2.5)
Finally, before invoking the lemma chars to secret crypto chars
from Listing 14 to transform a chars chunk to a secret crypto chars
chunk, one can best invoke the lemma public chars also from List-
ing 31 first. This allows for the reverse conversion later on using the lemma
public crypto chars just discussed.
Comparing secret memory regions It is clear by now that memory re-
gions that are described by a crypto chars chunk cannot be read. How-
ever, some protocols need to compare possibly secret memory regions. Con-
sider for example a protocol where a secret nonce is generated for freshness.
One participant generates this value and sends it in an encrypted form to
another principal. In some later stage of the protocol the first principal
receives an encrypted message and needs to check that it contains the orig-
inal value as part of its payload. To do this he needs to compare possibly
secret memory regions.
Our approach allows to compare possibly secret memory regions via the
standard library function memcmp. The contract for this function is shown
in Listing 33. It encodes the trivial semantics of the result being equal
to zero if and only if the two input buffers have the same content. If
however, the input buffers were not equal (i.e. result != 0) and and one
of the input buffers was a secret (i.e. kind1 == secret || kind2
== secret) then the network permission that the precondition requires is
revoked. This prevents badly implemented protocol implementations from
leaking secrets to the network by guessing their own (nonreadable) secret
through the function memcmp and making them readable. They only get
one guess and must abort the protocol if an unexpected value was found.
The predicate memcmp secret finally, is used to ensure that the prob-
ability of a badly implemented protocol leaking a secret via memcmp, is
exponentially small in the size of that secret. For each of the provided
buffers that is described by a secret crypto chars chunk, the contract
of memcmp requires a chunk of the predicate memcmp secret. Such a
chunk can only be produced if the corresponding buffer exactly contains a
cryptogram that was generated with one of the annotated cryptographic
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/*@
predicate memcmp_secret(char* buffer, int i,
list<char> cs, cryptogram cg) =
i == length(cs) && cs == chars_for_cg(cg) &&
cg_is_generated(cg)
;
@*/
int memcmp(char *array, char *array0, size_t i);
/*@ requires network_permission(?principal) &*&
[?f1]crypto_chars(?kind1, array, ?n1, ?cs1) &*&
(kind1 == normal ? true :
memcmp_secret(array, i, cs1, _)) &*&
[?f2]crypto_chars(?kind2, array0, ?n2, ?cs2) &*&
(kind2 == normal ? true :
memcmp_secret(array0, i, cs2, _)) &*&
i <= n1 &*& i <= n2; @*/
/*@ ensures [f1]crypto_chars(kind1, array, n1, cs1) &*&
[f2]crypto_chars(kind2, array0, n2, cs2) &*&
true == ((result == 0) ==
(take(i, cs1) == take(i, cs2))) &*&
result != 0 && (kind1 == secret ||
kind2 == secret) ?
true : network_permission(principal); @*/
Listing 33: Contract for memcmp
primitives and if that cryptogram is compared in its entirety. The prob-
ability of correctly guessing a secret consisting out of n bits, is 1 in 2n
(assuming a uniform distribution) and all the cryptographic primitives en-
sure a sufficiently large minimum size for the character presentation of each
cryptogram. So a principal verified with our model that is implemented to
leak, for example, his own secret key, has a probability of succeeding that
is exponentially small in the considerably large size of his key.
Clearing secret memory regions VeriFast checks that at the end of each
function you have freed all allocated memory (or have passed the ownership
to some called function) and that at the end of each block, all memory
regions allocated on the stack are present in the symbolic heap before
they are deallocated. In a protocol participant implementation where, for
example, some secret was generated and communicated in encrypted form,
there is an issue concerning deallocation. The buffer containing the secret
is described by a crypto chars chunk, but to release allocated memory
(both in the heap and on the stack), it needs to be converted to a chars
chunk. There is however no way to do this for a secret as this would
violate the invariant. The function zeroize from Listing 34 allows a
protocol implementation to erase its generated secrets from memory once
the protocol is finished. The fact that this is necessary is actually quite
sensible and it can be considered good practice to clear all secrets from
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void zeroize(char *buffer, int size);
//@ requires crypto_chars(_, buffer, size, _);
//@ ensures chars(buffer, size, _);
Listing 34: A function to clear secrets from memory
//@ fixpoint bool bad(int principal);
Listing 35: How to distinguish an honest principal from the attacker
memory before control is passed back to the invoker of the protocol.
2.6. The attacker model
The strength of the properties proven within our extended symbolic model
of cryptography depends on the capabilities of the attacker. If a protocol
can withstand a more powerful attacker, it can be considered a more secure
protocol. Following the symbolic model our attacker has complete access to
the untrusted network. He can grab any message from the network and put
any message on there that he can produce using the same cryptographic
API as the honest principals. We use the function bad from Listing 35 to
differentiate honest principals from the attacker.
To allow for the attacker to send anything he can produce with our
cryptographic API, he must have the following capabilities:
• Send a part of a message he finds on the network
• Send the concatenation of two messages he finds on the network
• Leak his own generated keys and nonces
• Send a hash created from a message he finds on the network
• Encrypt or decrypt a message from the network with a key he finds
on the network and send the result
In the embedding of our extended symbolic model, these capabilities are
encoded as lemma function types (for more information see [4]). Listing 36
illustrates such an encoded capability, more precisely the capability of the
attacker to leak his own keys. The contract expresses that if a principal is
bad, the invariant should hold for the cryptograms representing his keys.
This allows the attacker implementation to convert his own generated keys
from crypto chars chunks to chars and send them on the network. The
custom predicate proof pred can be used to give some extra protocol-
specific facts to the proof of the lemma.
Since the invariant for public cryptograms is protocol specific, the proofs
that this invariant allows the attacker to perform his attack are also pro-
tocol specific. So to ensure that a verified protocol is also capable of
withstanding any attack from the attacker (which is the ultimate goal of
the entire approach), the invariant must be closed under attacker actions,
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/*@
typedef lemma void bad_key_is_public(predicate(cryptogram) pub,
predicate() proof_pred)
(cryptogram key);
requires proof_pred() &*&
key == cg_symmetric_key(?p, _) &*& true == bad(p);
ensures proof_pred() &*&
[_]pub(key);
@*/
Listing 36: Example of an attacker capabitility
/*@
predicate public_invariant_constraints(predicate(cryptogram) pub,
predicate() pred) =
is_bad_key_is_public(_, pub, pred)
/* &*& ... */
;
@*/
void attacker();
/*@ requires [_]public_invar(?pub) &*&
public_invariant_constraints(pub, ?proof_pred) &*&
proof_pred() &*&
principals(?count1); @*/
/*@ ensures public_invariant_constraints(pub, proof_pred) &*&
proof_pred() &*&
principals(?count2) &*& count2 > count1; @*/
Listing 37: The attacker implementation as a C function
i.e. the attacker has all the capabilities previously mentioned. This can be
proven by writing a lemma implementation for each lemma function type
that represents an attacker capability. Only then a chunk of the predicate
public invariant constraints shown in Listing 37 can be created.
With such a chunk, the main function of the template from Subsection 2.1,
can run the attacker in parallel (i.e. as a separate thread) with your proto-
col implementation. If the entire application with the attacker as a separate
thread still verifies, it is certain that the attacker cannot interfere with the
cryptographic protocol.
2.7. Induction principle for cryptograms
In a traditional symbolic model, induction on messages is straightforward.
Since the definition of msg in Listing 8 of Subsection 2.4 is a proper in-
ductive datatype, recursive properties of messages can be specified directly
through induction. This is required, for example, to specify the invariant
for a recursive protocol. In our extended symbolic model messages have the
type list<char> and the results of cryptographic primitives are specified
by instances of the type cryptogram, an inductive datatype which is not
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/*@
fixpoint nat cg_level(cryptogram cg);
fixpoint bool cg_level_below(nat bound, cryptogram cg)
{
return int_of_nat(cg_level(cg)) < int_of_nat(bound);
}
fixpoint nat cg_level_max();
lemma_auto void cg_level_max_(cryptogram cg);
requires true;
ensures true == cg_level_below(cg_level_max(), cg);
@*/
Listing 38: The level of a cryptogram
recursive. To still allow for recursive reasoning in our model, a custom
induction principle for cryptograms was added to the model.
As a first step we associate a level with each cryptogram through the
initially completely undefined function cg level from Listing 38. Func-
tion values of cg level are natural numbers and they will be determined
during symbolic execution by invoking the lemmas discussed further on.
An upper bound on the level of a cryptogram can then be expressed via
the function cg level below. The level of a cryptogram corresponds to
the length of the longest sequence of recursively nested cryptograms it con-
tains through its payload. It is safe to assume that there exists an upper
bound cg level max for all cryptograms since we only consider finite pro-
tocols (or finite prefixes of execution traces of non-terminating protocols)
in our approach. In such a finite setting, generated cryptograms cannot
be recursively nested in a infinite fashion. The lemma cg level max
expresses that cg level max is indeed an upper bound for the level of all
cryptograms.
Our induction principle is expresses by the lemma cg level ind from
Listing 39: the level of each generated cryptogram that contains a second
cryptogram in its payload, is strictly greater than the level of the second
cryptogram. The base case for this induction is implicit as natural numbers
are finite.
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/*@
fixpoint option<list<char> > cg_payload(cryptogram cg)
{
switch(cg)
{
case cg_hash(pay1):
return some(pay1);
case cg_nonce(p1, c1):
return none;
case cg_symmetric_key(p1, c1):
return none;
case cg_auth_encrypted(p1, c1, pay1, iv1):
return some(pay1);
}
}
lemma void cg_level_ind(cryptogram cg1, cryptogram cg2);
requires true == cg_is_generated(cg1) &*&
cg_payload(cg1) == some(?pay) &*&
true == mem(cg2, cgs_in_chars(pay));
ensures true == cg_level_below(cg_level(cg1), cg2);
@*/
Listing 39: Induction principle for cryptograms
3. A Verified Cryptographic Protocol Example
In this section we illustrate how to apply our extended symbolic model
of cryptography to the verification of a simple protocol. More elaborate
verified protocols that illustrate the full capabilities of our approach can be
found in the latest VeriFast release and a summary of that verified protocol
suite is given in Section 4. Throughout the discussion in this section, we
present extracts from the complete code of the simple example which is
given in Appendix B. In Section 2 we narrowed the scope of our discussion
in this text to the generation of random values, hashing and symmetric
authenticated encryption. This is also the case for the code extracts dis-
played here. The version in Appendix B however, shows an implementation
of the example protocol that has been verified in the complete version of
our extended symbolic model.
In the rest of this section, we discuss all the different steps that have to
be taken to end up with a verified implementation of the example proto-
col. First, to get familiar with the protocol, we take a look a its protocol
transcript in Subsection 3.1. Then in Subsection 3.2, we state the security
goals of the example protocol using events and encode these goals in the
contracts for the protocol roles. In Subsection 3.3 we discuss a possible
invariant for public messages that is suited for the example protocol and
we discuss the rest of the verification process in Subsection 3.4.
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1. sender → receiver : {AUTH ENC(KEY, {0, NONCE})}
2. receiver → sender : {AUTH ENC(KEY, {1, NONCE})}
Figure 5: Protocol transcript of the example protocol
3.1. Protocol transcript
The protocol transcript of the example protocol is shown in Figure 5. In
this transcript AUTH ENC represents the authenticated encryption prim-
itive, KEY represents a key shared between sender and receiver, and
NONCE stands for a freshly generated nonce. We deliberately chose a
different notation for the primitives to avoid confusion with previous defi-
nitions that are part of our extended symbolic model.
The transcript in Figure 5 shows a pretty simple two-message protocol,
but it will suffice to illustrate our approach. It is implicitly assumed that,
before the execution of the protocol transcript, the sender generates a fresh
nonce represented by the identifier NONCE. For the first message this
nonce is prefixed with the tag 0 before it is encrypted. The encrypted
messages is then sent on the wire to the receiver. After the receiver
has processed this message he constructs the response message. For this
message, he prefixes the nonce he found in the payload of the first message
with the tag 1 before encrypting it. The resulting messages is sent back to
the sender.
3.2. Security goals and protocol events
It is instructive to state the security goals of the example protocol from
Figure 5. One of the goals is confidentiality of NONCE. This means that
after a successful execution of the protocol, only the sender and receiver
know the freshly generated nonce. A second, but less obvious goal is that
the receiver only accepts the first message if the sender indeed has sent
it, and the sender only accepts the second message if the receiver sent it.
Goals similar to the last, including most authentication properties, can
be expressed through correspondences between protocol events. Events
are simply propositions and correspondences are expressed through logical
implications that relate these propositions. For example, given 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
1 ≤ j ≤ m and some events Ei, Fj and E, the following is a generic event
correspondence:
E1 ∧ E2 ∧ . . . ∧ En ∧ ¬F1 ∧ ¬F2 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬Fm ⇒ E
While other events could be identified, we define four custom events for
the example protocol:
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/*@
fixpoint bool sender_msg1_event(int sndr, int rcvr, int nonce);
fixpoint bool receiver_msg2_event(int sndr, int rcvr, int nonce);
@*/
Listing 40: Custom protocol events for example protocol
Smsg1 : The sender has decided to send the first message.
Sfin: The sender has successfully completed the protocol.
Rmsg2 : The receiver has decided to send the second message.
Rfin: The receiver has successfully completed the protocol.
The two event correspondences that denote the second security goal of the
example protocol are then:
Rfin ⇒ Smsg1 Sfin ⇒ Rmsg2
To encode these events in VeriFast we only need to explicitly define
the events Smsg1 and Rmsg2 . The events Sfin and Rfin are implicitly
defined as termination of the sender and receiver protocol role implemen-
tation. Listing 40 shows the definition of the events Smsg1 and Rmsg2 as
the pure functions sender msg1 event and receiver msg2 event re-
spectively. For both these events, the argument provided for nonce should
be the sequence number of the random nonce generated by the sender. To-
gether, the parameters sndr, rcvr and nonce ensure that each run of
the example protocol has a distinct pair of events to describe its progress.
Finally, we can encode the security goals of the example protocol that
were mentioned in the beginning of this subsection. We specify them in the
contracts for the functions sender and receiver that both implement
a role of the example protocol. Listing 41 shows the headers of these
functions together with their contracts. It is instructive to first examine
the contracts while ignoring the encoded security goals.
As discussed in Section 2, both protocol roles should get a chunk of
the predicate public invar initialized with the protocol invariant. The
invariant itself, i.e. example pub, is discussed further on. Each of the
roles also needs access to a principal identity and a shared key. The shared
key must be generated with the identity of the sender before any of the
protocol roles can be started. As the contract of receiver indicates, the
identity of the receiver must be the information associated with the key.
The encoding of the security goals in Listing 41 makes use of the pure
functions example public key and example public nonce. These
are precisely defined further on, but their intended meaning is obvious. If
the provided key is public according to example public key, all bets
are off and no security goals are established in the postconditions. Oth-
erwise, the first security goal, i.e. confidentiality of the generated nonce,
is expressed by stating in the postconditions that the nonce is not public.
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void sender(char *key, char *nonce);
/*@ requires [_]public_invar(example_pub) &*&
principal(?sender, ?count) &*&
[?f1]cryptogram(key, KEY_SIZE, ?key_cs, ?key_cg) &*&
key_cg == cg_symmetric_key(sender, ?key_id) &*&
cg_info(key_cg) != 0 &*&
chars(nonce, NONCE_SIZE, _) &*&
true == sender_msg1_event(sender, cg_info(key_cg),
count + 1); @*/
/*@ ensures principal(sender, _) &*&
[f1]cryptogram(key, KEY_SIZE, key_cs, key_cg) &*&
cryptogram(nonce, NONCE_SIZE, ?n_cs, ?n_cg) &*&
col || example_public_key(sender, key_id, true) ?
[_]public_generated(example_pub)(n_cs)
:
n_cg == cg_nonce(sender, count + 1) &&
cg_info(n_cg) == cg_info(key_cg) &&
!example_public_nonce(sender, count + 1) &&
receiver_msg2_event(sender, cg_info(key_cg),
count + 1); @*/
void receiver(char *key, char *nonce);
/*@ requires [_]public_invar(example_pub) &*&
principal(?receiver, _) &*&
[?f1]cryptogram(key, KEY_SIZE, ?key_cs, ?key_cg) &*&
key_cg == cg_symmetric_key(?sender, ?key_id) &*&
receiver == cg_info(key_cg) &*& receiver > 0 &*&
chars(nonce, NONCE_SIZE, _); @*/
/*@ ensures principal(receiver, _) &*&
[f1]cryptogram(key, KEY_SIZE, key_cs, key_cg) &*&
cryptogram(nonce, NONCE_SIZE, ?n_cs, ?n_cg) &*&
col || example_public_key(sender, key_id, true) ?
[_]public_generated(example_pub)(n_cs)
:
n_cg == cg_nonce(sender, ?count) &*&
cg_info(n_cg) == cg_info(key_cg) &&
!example_public_nonce(sender, count) &&
sender_msg1_event(sender, cg_info(key_cg),
count); @*/
Listing 41: Contracts for the roles of example protocol
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/*@
predicate example_pub(cryptogram cg) =
switch (cg)
{
case cg_hash(pay0):
return true;
case cg_nonce(p0, c0):
return true == example_public_nonce(p0, c0);
case cg_symmetric_key(p0, c0):
return true == example_public_key(p0, c0, true);
case cg_auth_encrypted(p0, c0, pay0, iv0):
return example_public_key(p0, c0, true) ?
[_]public_generated(example_pub)(pay0)
:
[_]example_public_auth_encrypted(p0, c0, pay0, _, _);
}
;
@*/
Listing 42: Invariant for example protocol
The second security goal, captured by the event correspondences from be-
fore, are encoded by demanding in the postconditions that the proper event
has occurred. For example, in the postcondition of sender the implicit
event Sfin is trivially true. So if the provided key was confidential, the
postcondition must indeed require that the event Rmsg2 has occurred.
3.3. Invariant for public messages
Defining the protocol-specific invariant is the most difficult part of verifying
a protocol implementation. The invariant should allow honest principals to
execute the protocol and should allow the attacker to perform all the op-
erations that he is capable of according to our attacker model. A possible
invariant for the example protocol is shown in Listing 42 as the predi-
cate example pub. It uses the auxiliary definitions of the pure functions
example public nonce and example public key and of the predi-
cate example public auth encrypted. These auxiliary constructs are
all defined in Listing 43.
The protocol-specific invariant from Listing 42 determines for each cryp-
togram whether it is public or not. Being able to close a chunk of the
predicate example pub indicates that the cryptogram that was provided
as an arguments is indeed public. A cg hash cryptogram is trivially pub-
lic according to the definition of example pub. This is reasonable for the
example protocol as no participant needs to send a hash on the network,
but the attacker must be able to send his computed hashes as part of his
attack. Hence the case for cg hash in the definition of example pub
simply allows all hashes on the network. Next, the cases for cg nonce
and cg symmetric key cryptograms are defined in terms of, respectively,
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/*@
fixpoint bool example_public_key(int p, int c, bool symmetric)
{
return bad(p) || (symmetric &&
bad(cg_info(cg_symmetric_key(p, c))));
}
fixpoint bool example_public_nonce(int p, int c)
{
return cg_info(cg_nonce(p, c)) == 0 ?
true : bad(p) || bad(cg_info(cg_nonce(p, c)));
}
predicate example_public_auth_encrypted(int sndr, int key_id,
list<char> pay, int rcvr,
cryptogram nonce) =
rcvr == cg_info(cg_symmetric_key(sndr, key_id)) &*&
pay == cons(?tag, ?nonce_cs) &*&
nonce_cs == chars_for_cg(nonce) &*&
nonce == cg_nonce(sndr, ?nonce_id) &*&
cg_is_generated(nonce) && rcvr == cg_info(nonce) &*&
[_]public_generated(example_pub)(cons(tag, nil)) &*&
tag == TAG_MSG1 || tag == TAG_MSG2 &*&
tag == TAG_MSG1 ?
true == sender_msg1_event(sndr, rcvr, nonce_id)
:
true == receiver_msg2_event(sndr, rcvr, nonce_id)
;
@*/
Listing 43: Auxiliary constructs for the invariant
the pure functions example public key and example public nonce.
The case for a cg auth encrypted cryptogram finally, makes a distinc-
tion depending on which key was used for encryption. If the used key is
public according to example public key, the payload of the encrypted
message must only contain public cryptograms that are effectively gener-
ated as determined by the predicate public generated 8. Since all the
keys the attacker has access to are public, this allows the attacker to en-
crypt or decrypt any message he finds on the network and subsequently
put the result back on there. If the used key is not public, a chunk of the
predicate example public auth encrypted is required.
The pure function example public nonce from Listing 43 determines
when a nonce is public and thus allowed to be sent on the network. A dis-
tinction is made between nonces that have the information 0 associated
with it and nonces that do not. If the associated information is 0, a nonce
8Although the predicate public generated was not discussed nor defined in this text, its meaning
is quite straightforward. Having a public generated(cs) chunk means that all the cryptograms
present in cs, as determined by cgs in chars, are public and generated. The precise definition
can be found in the latest VeriFast release.
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is trivially public. The participant implementations will need to generate
nonces as initialization vectors for performing authenticated encryption.
These initialization vectors need to be sent in the clear and so an honest
protocol participant needs a way to generate public nonces. If the associ-
ated information is not 0, we choose the protocol-specific convention that
the generator of a nonce (i.e. the sender) records the intended recipient
of the nonce (i.e. the receiver) as the associated information. So then
a nonce is public if and only if the sender or the receiver is bad. No-
tice that, since the attacker is bad, this definition also ensures that all the
nonces he generates are public, regardless of the associated information.
The other pure function from Listing 43, example public key, deter-
mines when a symmetric encryption key is public. In the example protocol,
honest principals do not need to send their keys on the network (which is
rarely a wise thing to do). So the body of example public key returns
true if and only if one of the owners of the key is bad. Notice that
not only the creator of the key is an owner, but also the participant with
whom the key is shared. For the verification of the example protocol, we
choose the convention that the second owner is recorded as the associated
information of the key. Again notice that this definition ensures that all
the keys generated by the attacker are public, regardless of the associated
information he chooses.
The final definition of Listing 43 is example public auth encrypted
and it is the most interesting one. The initial six lines of its body describe
all the knowledge that the sender has about the first message he con-
structed. The sender knows that the payload of the encrypted message is
the character representation of a correctly generated nonce, prefixed with
some tag. This knowledge is transferred to the second message after the
receiver has parsed the first message and constructed the second. The
last part of the body describes the knowledge about protocol events. If
the sender is about to send the first message, the event Smsg1 must have
happened. If the receiver is about to send the second message, the event
Rmsg2 has occurred.
3.4. Verifying the complete protocol implementation
While defining the invariant is the most difficult part of verifying a pro-
tocol implementation with our approach, all the steps up until now were
preparations for the biggest task: verifying that the protocol role imple-
mentations fulfill their contracts using the specified invariant. This is done
by interactively through proving the postcondition from the precondition
using VeriFast. With the definitions and lemmas from the cryptographic
API, this should be fairly easy if the invariant is properly defined.
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Protocol SLOC ALOC Ratio VTime
dummy 125 90 0.72 1.46
hmac 246 132 0.54 1.43
rpc 416 175 0.42 1.43
enc and hmac 371 177 0.48 1.54
enc then hmac 398 176 0.44 1.58
hmac then enc 401 187 0.47 1.56
hmac then enc tagged 398 189 0.47 1.61
hmac then enc nested 508 229 0.45 2.10
auth enc 282 157 0.56 1.45
sign 330 181 0.55 1.49
nsl 1010 308 0.30 1.80
yahalom 1109 386 0.35 34.82
ALOC = Annotated Lines of Code
SLOC = Source Lines of Code
Ratio = ALOC/SLOC
VTime = Verification time
Figure 6: Results on protocols verified with the described approach
4. Results
Using the approach described in this report we were able to verify a sig-
nificant number of cryptographic protocol implementations. For now we
only verified custom-written protocol implementations and we leave tack-
ling preexisting implementations for future work.
Figure 7 shows some statistics about the protocol implementations we
verified. The annotation-to-source-code ratios indicate a high annotation
effort and this is as expected since we are dealing with intrinsically difficult
problems. However, the complexity of the annotations to verify protocol
implementations is relatively low (this is a subjective assessment and dif-
ficult to quantify). The motivation for this judgment is that most of the
complexity is contained in the cryptographic API. Although we have not
applied our method to preexisting protocol implementations at the mo-
ment, these initial verification efforts give some hope that the approach
described in this text is suited to verify functional correctness of preexist-
ing implementations.
We also implemented a classical symbolic API on top of the extended
symbolic API. This API is very similar to the one in [1] or [3] and we
implemented it to get an estimate of the consistency and usability of our
extended symbolic API. Some protocol implementations were also written
on top of this classical symbolic API and the results of this effort are
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Protocol SLOC ALOC Ratio VTime
high-level API 4631 1590 2.91 43.63
dummy protocol 127 94 1.35 1.49
secure storage 214 123 1.74 1.46
secure storage asym 215 121 1.78 1.54
rpc 353 189 1.87 1.80
recursive otway rees 663 423 1.57 1.86
Figure 7: Results on high-level API and protocols
shown in Figure 7. We do not further discuss the classical API here. Its
fully verified implementation is described in [5] and can be found in the
latest VeriFast release.
5. Conclusion
In this report we discussed our extended symbolic model of cryptogra-
phy. The approach presented here is a further development of the method
described in [5]. As in [1] and [3] we verify cryptographic protocol im-
plementations, but we target preexisting implementations written in the
C programming language. While our approach was developed to verify
preexisting implementations, we only verified self-written protocol imple-
mentations written against preexisting cryptographic primitive APIs for
now. Applying our approach to complete preexisting implementations is
left for future work.
Before discussing our approach, we motivated why the traditional sym-
bolic model is insufficient when verifying preexisting cryptographic proto-
col implementations. Instead, we propose the extended symbolic model
of cryptography for verifying preexisting implementations. After a de-
tailed discussion on the definition of this model in VeriFast, we showed
a complete verified example. Then we presented some successful verifica-
tion efforts within our extended symbolic model. These efforts seem to
indicate that our approach is well-suited for the verification of preexisting
cryptographic protocol implementations. Currently, a formalization of the
entire approach is being developed to prove the soundness of the extended
symbolic model of cryptography.
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/*@
inductive cryptogram =
/*| ... */
| cg_encrypted (int principal, int i,
list<char> pay, list<char> iv)
;
@*/
Listing 44: Extension for the definition of cryptogram
A. Regular Symmetric Encryption
In this appendix we are going to discuss a symmetric encryption and de-
cryption primitive of PolarSSL. We explain their semantics in our extended
symbolic model as we did for authenticated encryption in Subsection 2.4.
The contracts of the different PolarSSL functions concerned with regular
symmetric encryption, are quite similar to those for authenticated encryp-
tion. There is however one big difference: the postcondition for regular
decryption needs to take into account successful decryption with the wrong
key or initialization vector. This situation does not occur with authenti-
cated decryption, as successful authenticated decryption implies that the
correct key was provided. As it turns out, this possibility of successfully
decrypting with the wrong key or initialization vector renders the semantics
of regular decryption significantly more complex.
A.1. Encryption as a cryptogram
Before we can specify a contract for a symmetric encryption and decryp-
tion primitive, we need to extend the definition of cryptogram from
Subsection 2.4. In order to have a symbolic representation of symmetric
encrypted messages, we add the constructor cg encrypted. Listing 44
illustrates this updated definition of cryptogram and the argument list
of cg encrypted is exactly the same as that for cg auth encrypted.
The surjectivity and injectivity properties of chars for cg also hold for
cg encrypted.
A.2. Primitives for symmetric encryption and decryption
For the symmetric encryption and decryption primitives, we chose the AES
cipher as in Subsection 2.4. The C functions selected from PolarSSL that
are sufficient to encrypt and decrypt with this cipher are:
• aes setkey enc (initializing an aes context structure with a key)
• aes free (freeing an aes context structure)
• aes crypt cfb128 (encryption and decryption)
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struct aes_context{ /*...*/ };
typedef struct aes_context aes_context;
//@ predicate aes_context(aes_context *context) = true /* &*&...*/;
/*@ predicate aes_context_initialized(aes_context *context,
int principal, int count);@*/
int aes_setkey_enc(aes_context *ctx,
const char *key, unsigned int keysize);
/*@ requires [?f]cryptogram(key, ?size_key, ?cs_key, ?cg_key) &*&
keysize == size_key * 8 &*&
cg_key == cg_symmetric_key(?p, ?c) &*&
aes_context(ctx) &*&
(keysize == 128 || keysize == 192
|| keysize == 256); @*/
/*@ ensures [f]cryptogram(key, size_key, cs_key, cg_key) &*&
result == 0 ?
aes_context_initialized(ctx, p, c)
:
aes_context(ctx); @*/
void aes_free(aes_context *ctx);
//@ requires aes_context_initialized(ctx, _, _);
//@ ensures aes_context(ctx);
Listing 45: Initializing and freeing a context for symmetric encryption
As was the case for authenticated encryption, also for regular encryption
some context has to be initialized before anything else. Since we chose the
AES cipher, this context is an aes context structure. The function
aes setkey enc from Listing 45 initializes such a structure for a given
key and after its usage the function aes free, also from Listing 45, can
be used to free it.
The C function aes crypt cfb128 from Listing 46 implements both
encryption and decryption. Which of these two operations is performed is
determined by the value provided for the parameter mode: AES ENCRYPT
or AES DECRYPT. The next thing the precondition requires is a chunk of
the predicate aes context initialized, an initialization vector iv
with offset zero9 and an output buffer of size length. The remainder of
the requirements in the precondition and the entire postcondition depends
on the selected mode.
If aes crypt cfb128 is invoked for encryption, the rest of the contract
looks very similar to that of gcm crypt and tag from Listing 22. The
precondition ensures that the initialization vector is a fresh random value
and it also requires an input buffer to encrypt. The postcondition returns
9 We chose to annotate the stream cipher primitive aes crypt cfb128 as if it was a primitive
for encrypting a single message of any size, without allowing the updated initialization vector to
be used for a subsequent encryption. The advantage in doing so, instead of annotating e.g. the
cipher block chaining primitive aes crypt cbc, is that the contracts do not have to deal with the
complexity of padding (although it would be perfectly possible to do so).
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#define AES_ENCRYPT 1
#define AES_DECRYPT 0
int aes_crypt_cfb128(aes_context *ctx, int mode,
size_t length, size_t *iv_off, char *iv,
const char *input, char *output);
/*@ requires
mode == AES_ENCRYPT || mode == AES_DECRYPT &*&
aes_context_initialized(ctx, ?p1, ?c1) &*&
// AES only supports an iv with a length of 16 bytes
// only zero offset allowed, not spec’ed for CBF mode
crypto_chars(?iv_kind, iv, 16, ?iv_cs) &*&
u_integer(iv_off, 0) &*&
chars(output, length, _) &*& mode == AES_ENCRYPT ?
(
random_permission(?p2, ?c2) &*&
iv_cs == chars_for_cg(cg_nonce(p2, c2)) &*&
[?f]crypto_chars(?kind, input, length, ?in_cs) &*&
length >= MINIMAL_STRING_SIZE &*&
ensures
(
aes_context_initialized(ctx, p1, c1) &*&
// enforces a fresh IV on each invocation
random_permission(p2, c2 + 1) &*&
[f]crypto_chars(kind, input, length, in_cs) &*&
// content of updated iv is correlated with input
crypto_chars(join_kinds(iv_kind, kind), iv, 16, _) &*&
u_integer(iv_off, _) &*&
result != 0 ?
chars(output, length, _)
:
cryptogram(output, length, _, ?cg) &*&
cg == cg_encrypted(p1, c1, in_cs, iv_cs)
)
)
:
(
decryption_pre(true, ?garbage_in, ?p2, ?s, ?in_cs) &*&
[?f]cryptogram(input, length, in_cs, ?cg) &*&
cg == cg_encrypted(?p3, ?c3, ?out_cs3, ?iv_cs3) &*&
ensures
(
aes_context_initialized(ctx, p1, c1) &*&
[f]cryptogram(input, length, in_cs, cg) &*&
u_integer(iv_off, _) &*&
crypto_chars(?kind, output, length, ?out_cs) &*&
// content of updated iv is correlated with output
crypto_chars(join_kinds(iv_kind, kind), iv, 16, _) &*&
decryption_post(true, ?garbage_out,
p2, s, p1, c1, out_cs) &*&
garbage_out == (garbage_in || p1 != p3 ||
c1 != c3 || iv_cs != iv_cs3) &*&
result != 0 || garbage_out ?
kind == normal
:
kind == secret && out_cs == out_cs3
)
); @*/
//@ ensures true;
Listing 46: A cryptographic primitive for encryption and decryption
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all the permissions from the precondition and ensures that the resulting
output buffer is linked with the correct cryptogram. On first sight, the
remainder of the contract for decryption is also very similar to the contract
for gcm decrypt from Listing 23. Besides that there is no authentication
tag required for aes crypt cfb128, the only clear differences are the
chunk of predicate decryption pre in the precondition and the chunk
of predicate decryption post in the postcondition. The purpose of
these predicate chunks is discussed next.
A.3. Decryption with the wrong key or initialization vector
Before we define the predicates decryption pre and decryption post
itself, it is instructive to know what their high-level purpose is. These
predicates and all the definitions that follow in this subsection, conspire to
encode the following observation for unauthenticated decryption:
Successful unauthenticated decryption by itself does not convey any
information about the provided key. If however, during some protocol run,
one expects the decrypted payload to have a specific structure and it turns
out that this expectation was fulfilled, then the encrypted message must
have been created with the key or a cryptographic collision occurred.
This observation makes sense as for any secure cipher it should be very
hard to construct (without using encryption) a ciphertext that decrypts to
a payload with a specific structure. What we mean by a payload having a
specific structure is defined next.
Structure of a payload While other and more elaborate interpretations
of the concept of structure are perfectly possible, we chose for the interpre-
tation illustrated in Figure 8. Here, two messages are depicted, each with
a different kind of structure:
1. The message contains a known value: KNOWN VALUE.
2. Some part of the message is a character representation of a cryptogram
that has itself as a payload the concatenation of the rest of the message
(i.e. prefix ++ suffix).
A protocol participant that wants to perform unauthenticated decryption
can express both these kinds of expectations about the resulting payload us-
ing the inductive datatype structure from Listing 47. To actually prove
that a specific payload has some structure, the predicate has structure
can be used. This predicate precisely encodes the requirements for a char-
acter list cs to have the structure s. Some minimal sizes are required to
ensure that guessing a structure would become infeasible (see further). If
one is able to close a chunk of the predicate has structure with the
arguments cs and s, then one knows that the list cs has the structure s
according to our model.
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prefix KNOWN VALUE suffix
prefix CG( , prefix ++ suffix, ) suffix
Figure 8: Illustration of the structure of a payload
/*@
inductive structure =
| known_value(int offset, list<char> cs_known)
| cryptogram_with_payload(int offset, int length)
;
predicate has_structure(list<char> cs, structure s) =
exists(pair(?prefix, ?suffix)) &*&
switch(s)
{
case known_value(offset, cs_known):
return cs == append(prefix, append(cs_known, suffix)) &*&
length(cs_known) >= MINIMAL_STRING_SIZE &*&
length(prefix) == offset;
case cryptogram_with_payload(offset, length):
return exists(?cg) &*& cg_payload(cg) == some(?cs_pay) &*&
cs == append(prefix,
append(chars_for_cg(cg), suffix)) &*&
cs_pay == append(prefix, suffix) &*&
length(cs_pay) >= MINIMAL_STRING_SIZE &*&
length == length(chars_for_cg(cg)) &*&
length >= MINIMAL_STRING_SIZE &*&
length(prefix) == offset;
};
@*/
Listing 47: Describing the structure of some payload
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/*@
predicate decryption_garbage(bool sym, int principal,
structure s, int p_key,
int c_key, list<char> cs_out);
lemma void decryption_garbage(char *b, int n, structure s);
requires decryption_garbage(?sym, ?p, s, ?p_k, ?c_k, ?cs) &*&
col ? true : [_]has_structure(cs, s);
ensures decryption_permission(p) &*&
true == col;
@*/
Listing 48: A badly decrypted payload has the expected structure
Decrypted payload that follows expectation If a protocol participant
sees that a decrypted payload fulfills his expectations, then it must have
been encrypted with the same key and initialization vector or a crypto-
graphic collision occurred. To encode this fact we add the definitions from
Listing 48. A chunk of the predicate decryption garbage should be
returned in the postcondition of any unauthenticated decryption function
(and thus in the body of the predicate decryption post, see further).
As its name suggests, it should only be returned in the symbolic execution
branch of the postcondition where the wrong key or initialization vector
was provided. After decryption and once proven that the involved payload
has the expected structure, the lemma decryption garbage allows to
prove that a cryptographic collision indeed occurred if the wrong key or
initialization vector was provided.
For simplicity we left out the concept of key classifiers in Listing 48.
To support the complete attacker model from Subsection 2.6, the lemma
decryption garbage should, for some keys, require no proof of struc-
ture. A collision is then also not ensured in the postcondition. One example
of such keys are the keys of the attacker, since in general he will have no
idea what the structure of the decrypted payload will be during his attack.
For each protocol implementation, keys are thus classified in two distinct
sets by a protocol-dependent key classifier. For one of these sets the lemma
decryption garbage has the behavior shown in Listing 48, for the other
set it will have the trivial behavior just discussed. The examples in the
full encoding of our extended symbolic model illustrate this concept of key
classifiers.
Decryption permission As discussed in Subsection 2.2, a principal iden-
tity contains amongst others the permission to perform unauthenticated
decryption and this permission plays an important role here. Attentive
readers already saw this permission popping up in the postcondition of
decryption garbage from Listing 48. This is because after a decryp-
tion with the wrong key or initialization vector, the permission should
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/*@
predicate decryption_pre(bool sym, bool garbage,
int p, structure s, list<char> cs_in) =
!garbage ?
decryption_permission(p)
:
decryption_garbage(sym, p, s, _, _, ?cs_out) &*&
exists(pair(?prefix, ?suffix)) &*&
cs_out == append(prefix, append(cs_in, suffix))
;
predicate decryption_post(bool sym, bool garbage, int p,
structure s, int p_key, int c_key,
list<char> cs_out) =
!garbage ?
decryption_permission(p)
:
decryption_garbage(sym, p, s, p_key, c_key, cs_out)
;
@*/
Listing 49: Predicates decryption pre and decryption post
be revoked until one proves that the decrypted payload has the expected
structure. So the precondition of any unauthenticated decryption function
should require this permission (and thus it should be present in the body of
decryption pre, see further). The main reason for temporarily revoking
this permission is to prevent a principal from decrypting a message twice,
in which case he can use the result of the first decryption to formulate his
expectation for the second decryption.
The predicates decryption pre and decryption post Listing 49
shows the definitions of decryption pre and decryption post. We
will now explain these predicate definitions step by step. The first param-
eter of both predicates has the type bool and is named sym. It indicates
if the predicates are used for symmetric or asymmetric decryption. The
distinction between these two is not strictly necessary, but it prevents con-
fusion between the contracts for symmetric and asymmetric decryption.
An initial invocation of aes crypt cfb128 is performed with a chunk
of the predicate decryption pre where the garbage argument is false.
Its body then specifies that a decryption permission is required. As one
can see in the definition of decryption post, this permissions is sim-
ply returned in the postcondition of aes crypt cfb128, if the input was
no garbage and the provided key and initialization vector were the cor-
rect ones. If the input is garbage or if the provided key or initialization
vector was not correct, a chunk of the predicate decryption garbage
is returned. After checking that the decrypted payload has the expected
structure, one can invoke the lemma decryption garbage from List-
ing 48 to retrieve the decryption permission and to proof that a collision
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has occurred.
The until now undiscussed, second part of decryption pre, is only
relevant for protocol implementations that use some form of nested en-
cryption. Indeed, suppose that in a specific protocol, a participant needs
to decrypt a message two times in a row before he can inspect the re-
sulting payload. The definition of the predicate decryption pre allows
for this, since in the symbolic execution branch where the first decryption
was performed with the wrong key or initialization vector, a chunk of the
predicate decryption pre can still be produced for the second decryp-
tion. The initial expectation about the structure of the decrypted payload
that was fixed in the decryption pre chunk before the first decryption,
is simply passed on to the final decryption post chunk after the sec-
ond decryption. So if the final decrypted payload has the initial expected
structure, the lemma decryption garbage from Listing 48 can be in-
voked to retrieve the decryption permission. Note that it is no problem if
the second decryption is only performed on some part of the result of the
first decryption. The examples in the latest VeriFast release illustrate this
feature.
B. Complete verified example
This appendix lists all the source files of the verified protocol implementa-
tion discussed in Section 3.
B.1. Header file of the verified protocol implementation
#ifndef EXAMPLE_H
#define EXAMPLE_H
#include "general_definitions/general_definitions.h"
#include "polarssl_definitions/polarssl_definitions.h"
// PROTOCOL
// --------
//
// sender -> receiver : {0, NONCE}_KEY
// receiver -> sender : {1, NONCE}_KEY
#define TAG_MSG1 0
#define TAG_MSG2 1
#define KEY_SIZE 32
#define NONCE_SIZE 32
#define PLAINTEXT_SIZE (1 + NONCE_SIZE)
#define MESSAGE_SIZE (16 + 16 + PLAINTEXT_SIZE)
#define PORT 123456
/*@
fixpoint bool example_public_nonce(int p, int c)
{
return cg_info(cg_nonce(p, c)) == 0 ?
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true : bad(p) || bad(cg_info(cg_nonce(p, c)));
}
fixpoint bool example_public_key(int p, int c, bool symmetric)
{
return bad(p) || (symmetric && bad(cg_info(cg_symmetric_key(p, c))));
}
fixpoint bool sender_msg1_event(int sender, int receiver, int nonce_id);
fixpoint bool receiver_msg2_event(int sender, int receiver, int nonce_id);
predicate example_public_auth_encrypted(int sender, int key_id, list<char> pay,
int receiver, cryptogram nonce) =
receiver == cg_info(cg_symmetric_key(sender, key_id)) &*&
pay == cons(?tag, ?nonce_cs) &*&
// properties of nonce
nonce_cs == chars_for_cg(nonce) &*&
nonce == cg_nonce(sender, ?nonce_id) &*&
cg_is_generated(nonce) && receiver == cg_info(nonce) &*&
// properties of tag
[_]public_generated(example_pub)(cons(tag, nil)) &*&
tag == TAG_MSG1 || tag == TAG_MSG2 &*&
// events
tag == TAG_MSG1 ?
true == sender_msg1_event(sender, receiver, nonce_id)
:
true == receiver_msg2_event(sender, receiver, nonce_id)
;
predicate example_pub(cryptogram cg) =
switch (cg)
{
case cg_hash(pay0):
return true;
case cg_nonce(p0, c0):
return true == example_public_nonce(p0, c0);
case cg_symmetric_key(p0, c0):
return true == example_public_key(p0, c0, true);
case cg_auth_encrypted(p0, c0, pay0, iv0):
return example_public_key(p0, c0, true) ?
[_]public_generated(example_pub)(pay0)
:
[_]example_public_auth_encrypted(p0, c0, pay0, _, _);
// following constructors are not described in this technical report
case cg_public_key(p0, c0):
return true;
case cg_private_key(p0, c0):
return true == example_public_key(p0, c0, false);
case cg_hmac(p0, c0, pay0):
return true == example_public_key(p0, c0, true);
case cg_encrypted(p0, c0, pay0, iv0):
return [_]public_generated(example_pub)(pay0);
case cg_asym_encrypted(p0, c0, pay0, ent0):
return [_]public_generated(example_pub)(pay0);
case cg_asym_signature(p0, c0, pay0, ent0):
return true == example_public_key(p0, c0, false);
}
;
@*/
void sender(char *key, char *nonce);
/*@ requires [_]public_invar(example_pub) &*&
principal(?sender, ?count) &*&
[?f1]cryptogram(key, KEY_SIZE, ?key_cs, ?key_cg) &*&
key_cg == cg_symmetric_key(sender, ?key_id) &*&
cg_info(key_cg) != 0 &*&
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chars(nonce, NONCE_SIZE, _) &*&
// indicates that the sender wants to send the first message
true == sender_msg1_event(sender, cg_info(key_cg), count + 1); @*/
/*@ ensures principal(sender, _) &*&
[f1]cryptogram(key, KEY_SIZE, key_cs, key_cg) &*&
cryptogram(nonce, NONCE_SIZE, ?nonce_cs, ?nonce_cg) &*&
col || example_public_key(sender, key_id, true) ?
[_]public_generated(example_pub)(nonce_cs)
:
nonce_cg == cg_nonce(sender, count + 1) &&
cg_info(nonce_cg) == cg_info(key_cg) &&
!example_public_nonce(sender, count + 1) &&
// indicates that the receiver wanted to send the first message
receiver_msg2_event(sender, cg_info(key_cg), count + 1); @*/
void receiver(char *key, char *nonce);
/*@ requires [_]public_invar(example_pub) &*&
principal(?receiver, _) &*&
[?f1]cryptogram(key, KEY_SIZE, ?key_cs, ?key_cg) &*&
key_cg == cg_symmetric_key(?sender, ?key_id) &*&
receiver == cg_info(key_cg) &*& receiver > 0 &*&
chars(nonce, NONCE_SIZE, _); @*/
/*@ ensures principal(receiver, _) &*&
[f1]cryptogram(key, KEY_SIZE, key_cs, key_cg) &*&
cryptogram(nonce, NONCE_SIZE, ?nonce_cs, ?nonce_cg) &*&
col || example_public_key(sender, key_id, true) ?
[_]public_generated(example_pub)(nonce_cs)
:
nonce_cg == cg_nonce(sender, ?count) &*&
cg_info(nonce_cg) == cg_info(key_cg) &&
!example_public_nonce(sender, count) &&
// indicates that the sender wanted to send the first message
sender_msg1_event(sender, cg_info(key_cg), count); @*/
//@ predicate example_proof_pred() = true;
//@ PUBLIC_INVARIANT_PROOFS(example)
//@ DECRYPTION_PROOFS(example)
#endif
B.2. Source file of the verified protocol implementation
#include "example.h"
#include <stdlib.h>
void get_iv(havege_state *state, char* iv)
/*@ requires [_]public_invar(example_pub) &*&
havege_state_initialized(state) &*&
random_permission(?p, ?c) &*& chars(iv, 16, _);@*/
/*@ ensures havege_state_initialized(state) &*&
random_permission(p, c + 1) &*&
crypto_chars(normal, iv, 16, ?cs) &*&
cs == chars_for_cg(cg_nonce(p, c + 1));@*/
{
//@ close random_request(p, 0, false);
if (havege_random(state, iv, 16) == 0)
{
//@ open cryptogram(iv, 16, ?cs_iv, ?cg_iv);
//@ close cryptogram(iv, 16, cs_iv, cg_iv);
//@ close example_pub(cg_iv);
//@ leak example_pub(cg_iv);
// This lemma takes a cryptogram that is public to a chars chunk.
// It is part of the complete encoding of the extended model of cryptoraphy
// and can easily be proven with the lemma’s discussed in this report
//@ public_cryptogram(iv, cg_iv);
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//@ chars_to_crypto_chars(iv, 16);
return;
}
abort();
}
void encrypt(havege_state *state, char *key,
char tag, char* nonce, char* msg)
/*@ requires [_]public_invar(example_pub) &*&
havege_state_initialized(state) &*&
principal(?p1, _) &*&
[?f1]cryptogram(key, KEY_SIZE, ?key_cs, ?key_cg) &*&
key_cg == cg_symmetric_key(?sender, ?key_id) &*&
[?f2]cryptogram(nonce, NONCE_SIZE, ?nonce_cs, ?nonce_cg) &*&
nonce_cg == cg_nonce(?p2, ?nonce_id) &*&
chars(msg, MESSAGE_SIZE, _) &*&
tag == TAG_MSG1 || tag == TAG_MSG2 &*&
tag == TAG_MSG1 ?
p1 == sender && p2 == sender &&
cg_info(key_cg) != 0 &&
cg_info(key_cg) == cg_info(nonce_cg) &&
sender_msg1_event(p1, cg_info(key_cg), nonce_id)
:
p1 == cg_info(key_cg) &*& p1 != 0 &*&
col || example_public_key(sender, key_id, true) ?
[_]public_generated(example_pub)(nonce_cs)
:
cg_info(key_cg) == cg_info(nonce_cg) && p2 == sender &&
receiver_msg2_event(sender, p1, nonce_id); @*/
/*@ ensures havege_state_initialized(state) &*&
principal(p1, _) &*&
[f1]cryptogram(key, KEY_SIZE, key_cs, key_cg) &*&
[f2]cryptogram(nonce, NONCE_SIZE, nonce_cs, nonce_cg) &*&
chars(msg, MESSAGE_SIZE, _); @*/
{
char iv[16];
char mac[16];
gcm_context context;
//@ open principal(p1, _);
// Create plaintext
int p_size = 1 + NONCE_SIZE;
char *plaintext = malloc(p_size); if (plaintext == 0) abort();
*(plaintext) = tag;
//@ public_chars(plaintext, 1);
//@ chars_to_secret_crypto_chars(plaintext, 1);
//@ open [f2]cryptogram(nonce, NONCE_SIZE, nonce_cs, nonce_cg);
memcpy(plaintext + 1, nonce, NONCE_SIZE);
//@ close [f2]cryptogram(nonce, NONCE_SIZE, nonce_cs, nonce_cg);
//@ crypto_chars_join(plaintext);
// Encrypt
//@ chars_limits(msg);
get_iv(state, iv);
memcpy(msg, iv, 16);
//@ close gcm_context(&context);
if (gcm_init(&context, POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_AES, key,
(unsigned int) KEY_SIZE * 8) != 0) abort();
if (gcm_crypt_and_tag(&context, GCM_ENCRYPT, (unsigned int) p_size,
iv, 16, NULL, 0, plaintext, msg + 32,
16, msg + 16) != 0)
abort();
//@ assert exists(?enc_cg);
//@ crypto_chars_join(msg + 16);
//@ close cryptogram(msg + 16, 16 + p_size, ?enc_cs, enc_cg);
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// Prove that encrypted message is public
/*@ if (!col)
{
if (example_public_key(sender, key_id, true))
{
if (tag == TAG_MSG1)
{
close example_pub(nonce_cg);
leak example_pub(nonce_cg);
public_cryptogram(nonce, nonce_cg);
public_chars(nonce, NONCE_SIZE);
chars_to_secret_crypto_chars(nonce, NONCE_SIZE);
close [f2]cryptogram(nonce, NONCE_SIZE, nonce_cs, nonce_cg);
}
public_generated_join(example_pub, cons(tag, nil), nonce_cs);
}
else
{
close example_public_auth_encrypted(sender, key_id,
cons(tag, nonce_cs),
cg_info(key_cg), nonce_cg);
leak example_public_auth_encrypted(sender, key_id,
cons(tag, nonce_cs),
cg_info(key_cg), nonce_cg);
}
close example_pub(enc_cg);
leak example_pub(enc_cg);
public_cryptogram(msg + 16, enc_cg);
}
else
{
open cryptogram(msg + 16, 16 + p_size, enc_cs, enc_cg);
crypto_chars_to_chars(msg + 16, 16 + p_size);
}
@*/
//@ crypto_chars_to_chars(msg, 16);
//@ chars_join(msg);
// Cleanup
gcm_free(&context);
//@ open gcm_context(&context);
zeroize(plaintext, p_size);
free(plaintext);
zeroize(iv, 16);
//@ close principal(p1, _);
}
void decrypt(char *key, char tag, char* msg, char* nonce)
/*@ requires [_]public_invar(example_pub) &*&
principal(?p1, _) &*&
[?f1]cryptogram(key, KEY_SIZE, ?key_cs, ?key_cg) &*&
key_cg == cg_symmetric_key(?sender, ?key_id) &*&
chars(msg, MESSAGE_SIZE, _) &*&
chars(nonce, NONCE_SIZE, _) &*&
tag == TAG_MSG1 || tag == TAG_MSG2 &*&
tag == TAG_MSG1 ?
p1 == cg_info(key_cg)
:
p1 == sender; @*/
/*@ ensures principal(p1, _) &*&
[f1]cryptogram(key, KEY_SIZE, key_cs, key_cg) &*&
chars(msg, MESSAGE_SIZE, _) &*&
cryptogram(nonce, NONCE_SIZE, ?nonce_cs, ?nonce_cg) &*&
nonce_cg == cg_nonce(?nonce_p, ?nonce_id) &*&
tag == TAG_MSG1 ?
col || example_public_key(sender, key_id, true) ?
[_]public_generated(example_pub)(nonce_cs)
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:
cg_info(nonce_cg) == p1 && nonce_p == sender &&
sender_msg1_event(sender, p1, nonce_id)
:
col || example_public_key(sender, key_id, true) ?
[_]public_generated(example_pub)(nonce_cs)
:
cg_info(nonce_cg) == cg_info(key_cg) && nonce_p == sender &&
receiver_msg2_event(sender, cg_info(key_cg), nonce_id); @*/
{
char iv[16];
char mac[16];
gcm_context context;
//@ open principal(p1, _);
int p_size = 1 + NONCE_SIZE;
//@ chars_limits(msg);
//@ chars_to_crypto_chars(msg, MESSAGE_SIZE);
//@ crypto_chars_split(msg, 16);
//@ interpret_auth_encrypted(msg + 16, 16 + p_size);
//@ open cryptogram(msg + 16, 16 + p_size, ?cs, ?enc_cg);
//@ close cryptogram(msg + 16, 16 + p_size, cs, enc_cg);
//@ public_cryptogram(msg + 16, enc_cg);
//@ chars_to_crypto_chars(msg + 16, 16 + p_size);
//@ crypto_chars_split(msg + 16, 16);
//@ assert crypto_chars(normal, msg, 16, ?iv_cs);
//@ assert crypto_chars(normal, msg + 16, 16, ?mac_cs);
//@ assert crypto_chars(normal, msg + 32, p_size, ?enc_cs);
//@ assert cs == append(mac_cs, enc_cs);
memcpy(iv, msg, 16);
memcpy(mac, msg + 16, 16);
// Decrypt
char *plaintext = malloc(p_size); if (plaintext == 0) abort();
//@ close gcm_context(&context);
if (gcm_init(&context, POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_AES, key,
(unsigned int) KEY_SIZE * 8) != 0) abort();
//@ close exists(enc_cg);
//@ assert gcm_context_initialized(&context, sender, key_id);
if (gcm_auth_decrypt(&context, (unsigned int) p_size,
iv, 16, NULL, 0, mac, 16,
msg + 32, plaintext) != 0)
abort();
//@ assert crypto_chars(_, plaintext, p_size, ?pay_cs);
/*@ assert col || enc_cg ==
cg_auth_encrypted(sender, key_id, pay_cs, iv_cs); @*/
//@ open [_]example_pub(enc_cg);
/*@ if (!col)
{
if (example_public_key(sender, key_id, true))
{
public_crypto_chars(plaintext, p_size);
chars_to_crypto_chars(plaintext, p_size);
crypto_chars_split(plaintext, 1);
}
else
{
open [_]example_public_auth_encrypted(sender, key_id, pay_cs, _, _);
assert pay_cs == cons(?t, _);
assert [_]public_generated(example_pub)(cons(t, nil));
crypto_chars_split(plaintext, 1);
public_crypto_chars(plaintext, 1);
chars_to_crypto_chars(plaintext, 1);
}
}
else
{
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crypto_chars_to_chars(plaintext, p_size);
chars_to_crypto_chars(plaintext, p_size);
crypto_chars_split(plaintext, 1);
}
@*/
//@ assert crypto_chars(normal, plaintext, 1, _);
//@ close chars(&tag, 1, ?tag_cs);
//@ chars_to_crypto_chars(&tag, 1);
if (memcmp(plaintext, &tag, 1) != 0)
abort();
//@ crypto_chars_to_chars(&tag, 1);
//@ open chars(&tag, 1, tag_cs);
memcpy(nonce, plaintext + 1, NONCE_SIZE);
/*@ if (!col && !example_public_key(sender, key_id, true))
{
open [_]example_public_auth_encrypted(sender, key_id, pay_cs,
?receiver, ?nonce_cg);
assert pay_cs == cons(_, ?nonce_cs);
close cryptogram(nonce, NONCE_SIZE, nonce_cs, nonce_cg);
assert nonce_cg == cg_nonce(sender, ?nonce_id);
if (tag == TAG_MSG1)
{
assert p1 == receiver;
assert true == sender_msg1_event(sender, receiver, nonce_id);
}
else
{
assert p1 == sender;
assert true == receiver_msg2_event(sender, receiver, nonce_id);
}
crypto_chars_to_chars(plaintext, 1);
chars_to_secret_crypto_chars(plaintext, 1);
}
else
{
interpret_nonce(nonce, NONCE_SIZE);
}
@*/
//@ crypto_chars_join(plaintext);
// Cleanup
gcm_free(&context);
//@ open gcm_context(&context);
zeroize(plaintext, p_size);
free(plaintext);
zeroize(iv, 16);
//@ close principal(p1, _);
//@ crypto_chars_join(msg + 16);
//@ crypto_chars_join(msg);
//@ crypto_chars_to_chars(msg, MESSAGE_SIZE);
}
void sender(char *key, char *nonce)
/*@ requires [_]public_invar(example_pub) &*&
principal(?sender, ?count) &*&
[?f1]cryptogram(key, KEY_SIZE, ?key_cs, ?key_cg) &*&
key_cg == cg_symmetric_key(sender, ?key_id) &*&
cg_info(key_cg) != 0 &*&
chars(nonce, NONCE_SIZE, _) &*&
true == sender_msg1_event(sender, cg_info(key_cg), count + 1); @*/
/*@ ensures principal(sender, _) &*&
[f1]cryptogram(key, KEY_SIZE, key_cs, key_cg) &*&
cryptogram(nonce, NONCE_SIZE, ?nonce_cs, ?nonce_cg) &*&
col || example_public_key(sender, key_id, true) ?
[_]public_generated(example_pub)(nonce_cs)
61
:
cg_info(nonce_cg) == cg_info(key_cg) &&
nonce_cg == cg_nonce(sender, count + 1) &&
!example_public_nonce(sender, count + 1) &&
receiver_msg2_event(sender, cg_info(key_cg), count + 1); @*/
{
//@ open principal(sender, _);
int socket;
havege_state havege_state;
char nonce2[NONCE_SIZE];
net_usleep(20000);
if(net_connect(&socket, NULL, PORT) != 0)
abort();
if(net_set_block(socket) != 0)
abort();
//@ close havege_state(&havege_state);
havege_init(&havege_state);
//@ close random_request(sender, cg_info(key_cg), false);
if (havege_random(&havege_state, nonce, NONCE_SIZE) != 0)
abort();
//@ assert cryptogram(nonce, NONCE_SIZE, ?n_cs, ?n_cg);
//@ assert n_cg == cg_nonce(sender, count + 1);
{
char* msg = malloc(MESSAGE_SIZE); if (msg == 0) abort();
//@ close principal(sender, _);
encrypt(&havege_state, key, TAG_MSG1, nonce, msg);
//@ open principal(sender, _);
net_send(&socket, msg, (unsigned int) MESSAGE_SIZE);
net_recv(&socket, msg, (unsigned int) MESSAGE_SIZE);
//@ close principal(sender, _);
decrypt(key, TAG_MSG2, msg, nonce2);
//@ open principal(sender, _);
//@ open cryptogram(nonce, NONCE_SIZE, n_cs, n_cg);
//@ close memcmp_secret(nonce, NONCE_SIZE, n_cs, n_cg);
//@ open cryptogram(nonce2, NONCE_SIZE, ?n_cs2, ?n_cg2);
//@ close memcmp_secret(nonce2, NONCE_SIZE, n_cs2, n_cg2);
if (memcmp(nonce, nonce2, NONCE_SIZE) != 0)
abort();
//@ chars_for_cg_inj(n_cg, n_cg2);
free(msg);
}
//@ close cryptogram(nonce, NONCE_SIZE, n_cs, n_cg);
zeroize(nonce2, NONCE_SIZE);
havege_free(&havege_state);
//@ open havege_state(&havege_state);
net_close(socket);
//@ close principal(sender, _);
}
/*@ lemma void ack_receiver(int sender, int receiver, int nonce_id)
requires true == sender_msg1_event(sender, receiver, nonce_id);
ensures true == receiver_msg2_event(sender, receiver, nonce_id);
{
assume (receiver_msg2_event(sender, receiver, nonce_id));
}
@*/
void receiver(char *key, char *nonce)
/*@ requires [_]public_invar(example_pub) &*&
principal(?receiver, _) &*&
[?f1]cryptogram(key, KEY_SIZE, ?key_cs, ?key_cg) &*&
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key_cg == cg_symmetric_key(?sender, ?key_id) &*&
receiver == cg_info(key_cg) &*& receiver > 0 &*&
chars(nonce, NONCE_SIZE, _); @*/
/*@ ensures principal(receiver, _) &*&
[f1]cryptogram(key, KEY_SIZE, key_cs, key_cg) &*&
cryptogram(nonce, NONCE_SIZE, ?nonce_cs, ?nonce_cg) &*&
col || example_public_key(sender, key_id, true) ?
[_]public_generated(example_pub)(nonce_cs)
:
nonce_cg == cg_nonce(sender, ?count) &*&
cg_info(nonce_cg) == cg_info(key_cg) &&
!example_public_nonce(sender, count) &&
// indicates that the sender wanted to send the first message
sender_msg1_event(sender, cg_info(key_cg), count); @*/
{
//@ open principal(receiver, _);
int socket1;
int socket2;
havege_state havege_state;
if(net_bind(&socket1, NULL, PORT) != 0)
abort();
if(net_accept(socket1, &socket2, NULL) != 0)
abort();
if(net_set_block(socket2) != 0)
abort();
//@ close havege_state(&havege_state);
havege_init(&havege_state);
{
char *msg = malloc (MESSAGE_SIZE); if (msg == 0) abort();
int size = net_recv(&socket2, msg, (unsigned int) MESSAGE_SIZE);
if (size != MESSAGE_SIZE) abort();
//@ close principal(receiver, _);
decrypt(key, TAG_MSG1, msg, nonce);
//@ assert cryptogram(nonce, NONCE_SIZE, ?nonce_cs, ?nonce_cg);
//@ assert nonce_cg == cg_nonce(_, ?nonce_id);
/*@ if (!col && !example_public_key(sender, key_id, true))
ack_receiver(sender, receiver, nonce_id); @*/
encrypt(&havege_state, key, TAG_MSG2, nonce, msg);
//@ open principal(receiver, _);
net_send(&socket2, msg, (unsigned int) MESSAGE_SIZE);
free (msg);
}
havege_free(&havege_state);
//@ open havege_state(&havege_state);
net_close(socket2);
net_close(socket1);
//@ close principal(receiver, _);
}
B.3. Main function that executes the verified protocol
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include "example.h"
#define NB_OF_RUNS 10
//@ import_module public_invariant_mod;
//@ import_module principals_mod;
//@ import_module decryption_mod;
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/*@
predicate_family_instance pthread_run_pre(attacker_t)(void *data, any info) =
[_]public_invar(example_pub) &*&
principal(?bad_one, _) &*& true == bad(bad_one) &*&
public_invariant_constraints(example_pub, example_proof_pred) &*&
[_]decryption_key_classifier(example_public_key) &*&
is_public_key_classifier(_, example_pub, example_public_key,
example_proof_pred);
@*/
void *attacker_t(void* data) //@ : pthread_run_joinable
//@ requires pthread_run_pre(attacker_t)(data, ?info);
//@ ensures false;
{
while(true)
//@ invariant pthread_run_pre(attacker_t)(data, info);
{
//@ open pthread_run_pre(attacker_t)(data, info);
//@ close example_proof_pred();
attacker();
//@ open example_proof_pred();
//@ close pthread_run_pre(attacker_t)(data, info);
}
return 0;
}
/*@
predicate_family_instance pthread_run_pre(sender_t)(void *data, any info) =
[_]public_invar(example_pub) &*&
info == some(?sender) &*& principal(sender, ?count) &*&
[1/2]cryptogram(data, KEY_SIZE, ?key_cs, ?key_cg) &*&
key_cg == cg_symmetric_key(sender, ?id) &*&
cg_info(key_cg) != 0 &&
sender_msg1_event(sender, cg_info(key_cg), count + 1);
predicate_family_instance pthread_run_post(sender_t)(void *data, any info) =
[_]public_invar(example_pub) &*&
info == some(?sender) &*& principal(sender, _) &*&
[1/2]cryptogram(data, KEY_SIZE, ?key_cs, ?key_cg);
@*/
void *sender_t(void* data) //@ : pthread_run_joinable
//@ requires pthread_run_pre(sender_t)(data, ?x);
//@ ensures pthread_run_post(sender_t)(data, x) &*& result == 0;
{
//@ open pthread_run_pre(sender_t)(data, x);
char nonce[NONCE_SIZE];
sender(data, nonce);
//@ open cryptogram(nonce, NONCE_SIZE, _, _);
zeroize(nonce, NONCE_SIZE);
//@ close pthread_run_post(sender_t)(data, x);
return 0;
}
/*@
predicate_family_instance pthread_run_pre(receiver_t)(void *data, any info) =
[_]public_invar(example_pub) &*&
info == some(?receiver) &*& principal(receiver, _) &*&
[1/2]cryptogram(data, KEY_SIZE, ?key_cs, ?key_cg) &*&
key_cg == cg_symmetric_key(?sender, ?id) &*&
receiver == cg_info(key_cg) &*& receiver > 0;
predicate_family_instance pthread_run_post(receiver_t)(void *data, any info) =
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[_]public_invar(example_pub) &*&
info == some(?receiver) &*& principal(receiver, _) &*&
[1/2]cryptogram(data, KEY_SIZE, ?key_cs, ?key_cg);
@*/
void *receiver_t(void* data) //@ : pthread_run_joinable
//@ requires pthread_run_pre(receiver_t)(data, ?x);
//@ ensures pthread_run_post(receiver_t)(data, x) &*& result == 0;
{
//@ open pthread_run_pre(receiver_t)(data, x);
char nonce[NONCE_SIZE];
receiver(data, nonce);
//@ open cryptogram(nonce, NONCE_SIZE, _, _);
zeroize(nonce, NONCE_SIZE);
//@ close pthread_run_post(receiver_t)(data, x);
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char **argv) //@ : main_full(main_app)
//@ requires module(main_app, true);
//@ ensures true;
{
pthread_t a_thread;
havege_state havege_state;
//@ open_module();
//@ PUBLIC_INVARIANT_CONSTRAINTS(example)
//@ DECRYPTION_CONSTRAINTS(example)
//@ public_invariant_init(example_pub);
//@ decryption_init(example_public_key);
//@ principals_init();
//@ int attacker = principal_create();
//@ close havege_state(&havege_state);
havege_init(&havege_state);
//@ assume (bad(attacker));
//@ close pthread_run_pre(attacker_t)(NULL, some(attacker));
pthread_create(&a_thread, NULL, &attacker_t, NULL);
//@ leak pthread_thread(_, attacker_t, NULL, some(attacker));
#ifdef EXEC
int i = 0;
while (i++ < NB_OF_RUNS)
#else
while (true)
#endif
/*@ invariant [_]public_invar(example_pub) &*&
havege_state_initialized(&havege_state) &*&
principals(?count) &*& count > 0;
@*/
{
//@ int sender = principal_create();
//@ int receiver = principal_create();
char* key = malloc(KEY_SIZE);
if (key == 0) abort();
//@ close random_request(sender, receiver, true);
//@ open principal(sender, 0);
if (havege_random(&havege_state, key, KEY_SIZE) != 0) abort();
//@ assert cryptogram(key, KEY_SIZE, ?cs_key, ?cg_key);
{
pthread_t s_thread, r_thread;
//@ close principal(sender, 1);
//@ assume (sender_msg1_event(sender, cg_info(cg_key), 2));
//@ close pthread_run_pre(sender_t)(key, some(sender));
//@ close pthread_run_pre(receiver_t)(key, some(receiver));
pthread_create(&r_thread, NULL, &receiver_t, key);
pthread_create(&s_thread, NULL, &sender_t, key);
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#ifdef EXEC
pthread_join(r_thread, NULL);
pthread_join(s_thread, NULL);
printf("Iteration %i\n", i);
#endif
//@ leak pthread_thread(_, sender_t, key, some(sender));
//@ leak pthread_thread(_, receiver_t, key, some(receiver));
}
//@ leak malloc_block(key, KEY_SIZE);
}
}
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